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CHARITY AT WORK:
PROPOSING A CHARITABLE FLEXIBLE SPENDING ACCOUNT
Alyssa A. DiRusso*
I. INTRODUCTION
In charitable giving, it is not just the thought that counts. American society
depends upon a robust third sector to provide public services and benefits, and to
lessen the burdens of government. 1 The third sector, in return, depends upon
government to regulate charitable organizations and provide mechanisms for their
financial support. 2
The traditional primary mechanism for providing support to nonprofits is the
charitable income tax deduction, available to taxpayers who itemize. 3 This system,
although noble in its aspirations and moderately successful in its application, falls
short of the ideal. As an itemized deduction, its incentives reach only taxpayers
who itemize. The majority of taxpayers who do not itemize—who tend to be less
wealthy—reap no benefit from the tax incentive.
* © 2014 Alyssa A. DiRusso. Professor of Law at Samford University’s Cumberland
School of Law. J.D., University of Texas School of Law; B.S., Psychology, Carnegie
Mellon University. The Author gratefully acknowledges the AALS Section on
Administrative Law for hosting its New Voices in Administrative Law Panel and the
Cumberland School of Law for a summer research grant that supported work on this
Article. The Author also wishes to thank her excellent research assistants, Devon Rankin
and Kent Sausaman; the reviewers who were kind enough to offer constructive criticism on
this Article, particularly David Brennen, Bryan Camp, Stewart Lazar, Joe Blackburn,
Brannon Denning, and Wendy Greene; and the professors who attended the Cumberland
Faculty Colloquium.
1
The first sector is government, the second sector is business, and the third sector is
philanthropy. See ROBERT L. PAYTON & MICHAEL P. MOODY, UNDERSTANDING
PHILANTHROPY: ITS MEANING AND MISSION 46–52 (2008). The third sector is also defined
as “the voluntary and community sector, the non-profit sector, the social enterprise sector
and civil society.” Stephen P. Osborne, Key Issues for the Third Sector in Europe, in THE
THIRD SECTOR IN EUROPE: PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES 6 n.1 (Stephen P. Osborne ed.,
2008).
2
The U.S. third sector has a dualist approach to governance, with regulation at both
the state and national levels, which “bifurcates responsibility for regulating” nonprofits
between state government and federal government. See Garry W. Jenkins, Incorporation
Choice, Uniformity, and the Reform of Nonprofit State Law, 41 GA. L. REV. 1113, 1125
(2007). On the regulation of charitable organizations broadly, see MARION R. FREMONTSMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: FEDERAL AND STATE LAW AND
REGULATION 151–52 (2004).
3
See I.R.C. § 170(a) (2012).
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Relegating the benefits of the charitable deduction to those who itemize their
income taxes threatens the deduction’s goals of equity and pluralism. 4 A tax
incentive that by its design systematically excludes two-thirds of the population
fails to reflect a truly diverse and representative expression of society’s charitable
priorities. 5 It is also inequitable, largely excluding lower-income taxpayers who
have a greater need for the tax subsidy, and providing disproportionate benefits to
some demographic groups at the expense of others.
Discrimination against nonitemizing taxpayers may seem benign enough at
first. Categorizing on the basis of whether a person itemizes is hardly a suspect
classification, like race or sex, which naturally triggers our concern. Itemizers and
nonitemizers are, however, different demographic groups which may have very
different priorities. Nestled within these demographic details are distinctions that
matter.
Those itemizers for whom charitable deductions are available tend to be the
wealthiest among us. Using IRS Statistics of Income from 2005, the Tax
Foundation’s research demonstrates the class divisions between those who itemize
and those who do not. 6 There is an enormous gap between higher-income and
lower-income households in itemization rates: over 89% of households earning
$100,000 or more itemize, 7 compared to less than 18% of those with incomes
under $50,000. 8
These economic distinctions map onto other demographic distinctions that
matter. Hidden in these statistics based on income is a startling divide based on
race. The IRS does not collect data on race of itemizers and nonitemizers, but U.S.
Bureau of the Census data provides a contrast between the under-$50,000 and
over-$100,000 groups. 9 In 2009, nearly two-thirds of blacks and Latinos
respectively reported incomes of less than $50,000 (61% of blacks and 60.2% of
Latinos). 10 By comparison, only about a third of whites and Asians, respectively,
4

For more on the goals of the charitable deduction, see infra Part III.
In 2010, roughly 66% of taxpayers (93.68 million of 142.89 million returns) took
the standard deduction, while nearly 33% of taxpayers itemized (46.64 million of 142.89
million returns). INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., STATISTICS OF INCOME—2010 INDIVIDUAL
INCOME TAX RETURNS 38 tbl.1.2 (2012), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/10inal
cr.pdf.
6
See GERALD PRANTE, TAX FOUND., MOST AMERICANS DON’T ITEMIZE ON THEIR
TAX RETURNS (2007) (at p. 4 of .pdf manuscript) (noting that “itemization is highest
among high-income taxpayers”), available at http://taxfoundation.org/sites/taxfoundation.
org/files/docs/ff95.pdf.
7
Id. tbl.1. This amount spikes to 93.34% for those with incomes over $200,000, the
highest income division marked by the table. Id.
8
Id.
9
See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 455
tbl.696 (2012), available at http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0695
.pdf.
10
See id.
5
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report being in this lower-income group (38.9% of whites and 32.2% of Asians). 11
Whites and Asians are also disproportionately present in the over-$100,000 group,
with 27% of whites and 37.7% of Asians reporting incomes over $100,000,
compared to only 12.1% of blacks and 12.4% of Latinos. 12 Rules that divide based
on income have disproportionate impacts on certain races. 13
The division between itemizers and nonitemizers, however, is not based
purely on income (and the attributes that may underlie income levels, such as
race). Itemized deductions are also geographically discriminatory. People who live
in states with high state and local tax burdens, like Maryland and New Jersey, are
far more likely to claim itemized deductions. 14 In Maryland, 50.03% of taxpayers
itemize, and in New Jersey, 45.23% do. 15 Those with lower state tax burdens, like
West Virginia and Texas, have much lower rates of itemization (18.02% and
25.99%, respectively). 16 States with low home values, which in turn reduce the
value of the mortgage-interest deduction, also produce fewer taxpayers who
itemize their returns. 17 Whether an individual can take a federal tax deduction for
charitable contributions is largely affected by the local tax policy of his or her
home state.
Homeownership also affects whether an individual is likely to itemize. Of the
45,695,736 itemized returns filed for the 2009 tax year, 37,004,065 of them
(roughly 81%) claimed a deduction for interest paid. 18 There are notable
demographic differences in rates of homeownership. Younger individuals, for
example, are less likely to own homes. 19 In 2000, the U.S. census showed that
11

See id.
Id.
13
See Beverly I. Moran & William Whitford, A Black Critique of the Internal
Revenue Code, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 751, 757–58. In addition to supporting the notion that
the tax code benefits whites more than blacks due to income disparities, the authors argue
that factors other than income also account for the differential impact of tax provisions on
black taxpayers. Id. For more information on how the tax code has broad impacts based on
race and class, see Dorothy A. Brown, Teaching Civil Rights Through the Basic Tax
Course, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 809, 813–20 (2010).
14
See PRANTE, supra note 6 (at p. 3 of .pdf manuscript).
15
Id.
16
Id. tbl.1.
17
Id. (at p. 3 of .pdf manuscript).
18
SOI Tax Stats—Individual Statistical Tables by Filing Status, Table 2.2, Returns
With Itemized Deductions: Sources of Income, Adjustments, Deductions, Credits, and Tax
Items, by Marital Status, Tax Year 2009 (July 2011), http://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats
---Individual-Statistical-Tables-by-Filing-Status (scroll down to “Individual Income Tax
Returns with Exemptions and Itemized Deductions”; select the year “2009” under
“Individual Complete Report (Publication 1304), Table 2.2”). Deductible interest includes
that paid on home mortgages, home equity lines of credit, points, and other specific debts.
See I.R.C. § 163(h) (2012).
19
See Kelly Pottorff & Tammy Tidmore, Home Buyer Demographics Show “Echo
Boomers” Poised to Revive Ownership Stats, DEL MAR TIMES (Nov. 1, 2012), http://www.
12
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people over the age of sixty-five owned homes at double the rates of those under
thirty-five. 20 Homeownership also varies by race, income level, and state. 21
Demographic differences clearly underlie the division between itemizer and
nonitemizer. Should only people who itemize derive an income tax benefit from
charitable donations? Do we only intend to incentivize and reward charitable
giving within certain privileged groups based on income, race, homeownership, or
state of residence? Unless we believe these assertions, the itemized deduction for
charitable donations is flawed. The incentive should be restructured to be more
inclusive and fair, supporting the contributions and the voices of nonitemizing
individuals.
Scholars and policy makers have largely assumed that the alternatives
available for modifying the charitable income tax deduction are rather limited. 22
The deduction could be moved above the line and made available to nonitemizers.
It could be eliminated or capped, shrinking the advantage it gives to higher-income
itemizers. It could be exchanged for a credit, either dollar for dollar or at some
lower proportion. It could be left the way it is. These seem to be the only options.
They are not.
The charitable deduction does not represent the first occasion where the
Internal Revenue Code (“the Code”) had a deduction whose benefits failed to reach
nonitemizing taxpayers. 23 The conundrum facing the charitable deduction mirrors
that which historically faced the income tax deduction for medical expenses.
Although intended to support the tax policy of providing relief to taxpayers for
delmartimes.net/2012/11/01/home-buyer-demographics-show-%e2%80%9cecho-boomers
%e2%80%9d-poised-to-revive-ownership-stats/ (“Data drawn from 2011 shows that the
sharpest increase in homeownership indeed occurs within this jump from the 25 to 29-yearold cohort to the 30 to 45-year-old cohort.”).
20
See Historical Census of Housing Tables: Homeownership by Selected
Demographic and Housing Characteristics, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/
housing/census/data/ownerchar.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2014) (noting that “[o]lder
householders (65 years and over) have always had high homeownership rates” with those
in the 65+ group having 78% homeownership rates, compared to 39% of the under-35
group).
21
See Historical Census of Housing Tables: Homeownership by Race and Hispanic
Origin, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/census/historic/o
wnershipbyrace.html (last updated Oct. 31, 2011).
22
See generally CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, A CBO STUDY: OPTIONS FOR CHANGING THE
TAX TREATMENT OF CHARITABLE GIVING (2011) (reporting findings from a study by the
Congressional Budget Office), http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/121x
x/doc12167/charitablecontributions.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2014); Vada Waters Lindsey,
The Charitable Contribution Deduction: A Historical Review and a Look to the Future, 81
NEB. L. REV. 1056 (2003) (outlining the historical background of the charitable deduction
as well as possible alternatives and adjustments being considered by Congress).
23
Although section 213 of the Internal Revenue Code provides for a deduction based
on unreimbursed medical expenses, nonitemizing taxpayers cannot use this deduction
according to section 62. See I.R.C. §§ 62, 213.
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burdensome medical costs, the assistance of the deduction is out of reach for
taxpayers who do not itemize. Fortunately, in the medical-expense arena, a
solution evolved that entitled working Americans, regardless of income level or
ability to itemize, to receive tax subsidies for medical costs: a flexible spending
arrangement.
A flexible spending arrangement (sometimes also called a flexible spending
account or an FSA) is an employee benefit offered under a cafeteria plan.24 The
benefit allows employees to set aside pretax dollars to fund an account from which
they can be reimbursed for eligible expenses. A flexible spending arrangement
incurs the same tax cost as a deduction, in that the revenue loss to the government
for providing the benefit is the value of the deduction multiplied by the taxpayer’s
marginal rate. Unlike a deduction, however, an FSA has the inclusiveness of a tax
credit, in that it is potentially available to all employees, rather than only to
taxpayers who itemize. Several types of FSAs are recognized by tax law—most
notably the medical flexible spending arrangement (MFSA). This Article will
argue that a charitable FSA ought to be recognized as well.
Under a charitable flexible spending arrangement (CFSA), employers could
offer an extension of their cafeteria plan benefits to all employees, in which
employees could elect to set aside a pretax contribution to be used for charitable
contributions. Management and administration of a CFSA would work in a manner
similar to medical flexible spending arrangements. 25 Employees opting in to the
plan would have pretax contributions deducted from their paycheck. Upon making
a qualifying charitable donation, the employee would submit documentation of that
donation to the plan administrator. 26 If the plan administrator found the
contribution to be in compliance with the rules for eligible expenditures (the same
rules that would apply to the charitable income tax deduction), the plan
administrator would reimburse the employee from the employee’s charitable
flexible spending account. 27 Like the analogous rule for medical costs, a taxpayer
24

A cafeteria plan is a collection of employee benefits that qualifies for favorable
income tax treatment. See id. § 125(i)–(j).
25
For details on how employers establish and implement FSAs, see Brenda PorterRockwell, How to Set Up a Flexible Spending Account Program, INC.COM., http://www.inc
.com/guides/2010/04/setting-up-a-flexible-spending-plan.html (last updated Apr. 21, 2010).
26
Many benefits-administration companies provide FSA administration services,
including substantiation of expenses. WageWorks, Inc., for example, provides services to
employers who offer FSAs. See WageWorks-FBMC Transaction and Partnership Expands
Market Opportunities, PR NEWSWIRE (December 6, 2010), http://www.prnewswire.com/ne
ws-releases/wageworks-fbmc-transaction-and-partnership-expands-market-opportunities-1
11378969.html.
27
The substantiation procedures would be similar to what corporate private
foundations operating matching grant programs conduct, and experience in matching grant
administration could provide useful guidance. For guidance on how these programs are
administered, see THE HEP/CASE MATCHING GIFT NETWORK, MATCHING GIFT
ADMINISTRATION: EXAMINING THE EVOLVING WORLD OF MATCHING GIFTS 1–16 (Tracy
Baird et. al. eds., 4th ed. 2009), available at http://www.case.org/Documents/MatchingGift
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who was reimbursed for a particular expense from an FSA could not reflect the
same expense as an itemized deduction, 28 but the taxpayer could take an itemized
deduction for other qualifying costs not reimbursed from the account. 29 If any
balance remained at the end of the plan year, the remaining funds would pass to a
default charitable organization the employee had selected. 30
Charitable Flexible Spending Accounts, offered as an alternative to the
traditional itemized charitable income tax deduction, offer many advantages. 31
Most notably, they can bring significant numbers of nonitemizing taxpayers into
the reach of charitable tax incentives. This is critical for reasons of equity,
diversity, and pluralism. It is also a potential bargain to the extent many
nonitemizers have lower incomes. Because lower-income taxpayers have lower
marginal tax rates, donations from this group subsidized by tax rules have lower
tax cost than those that provoke revenue loss from taxpayers in higher brackets.
This Article will propose a Charitable Flexible Spending Account system to
enhance the current regulatory regime of the itemized charitable deduction. Part II
begins by explaining the current charitable income tax deduction, including its
history and the policies underlying its enactment. Part III then explores academic
critiques and criticisms of the charitable deduction, and it determines the extent to
which the current system of charitable tax incentives is sufficient. Part IV
discusses the parallel challenge and development of tax rules relating to medical
expense deductions, and it explains both the itemized deduction for medical
expenses and medical flexible spending arrangements. Building upon this
foundation, Part V proposes a Charitable Flexible Spending Account system and
explains the details of its implementation. Finally, the Article will conclude with
thoughts on the future of the evolution of tax incentives for charitable giving.

s/MatchingGiftAdministration_4th_Edition.pdf, and ROBERT S. COLLIER ET AL., COUNCIL
MICH. FOUNDS., A GUIDE FOR A SUCCESSFUL MATCHING GIFT PROGRAM 1–8 (2002),
available at http://www.dfwonline.org/userdata/userfiles/file/Corporate%20Grantmakers%
20Materials/11108.PDF.
28
Robert E. Lynn, Optimize the Tax Savings for Specialized or Innovative Medical
Care, 79 PRAC. TAX STRATEGIES 151, 155 (2007).
29
See I.R.C. § 213(a) (2012) (allowing taxpayers to deduct qualifying medical
expenses paid in excess of a set percentage of their adjusted gross income); infra notes
160–161 and accompanying text.
30
Alternatively, any balance remaining in the account could pass to the employer, as
is the case with health-care FSAs. See Employee Benefits—Cafeteria Plans, 70 Fed. Reg.
43,938, 43,942–43 (proposed Aug. 6, 2007) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1).
31
My suggestion is to offer charitable flexible spending accounts as an option to all
employees whose employers are willing to sponsor a plan, while leaving the current
charitable income tax deduction intact. Although it would be possible to replace, rather
than supplement, the charitable deduction with a CFSA, such a transition would remove the
charitable tax incentives from donors who itemize but are not employed, including many
high-net-worth donors whose income comes from investments. A CFSA therefore seems
better suited to act as an alternative rather than a substitute.
OF
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II. THE CHARITABLE INCOME TAX DEDUCTION
A. The Modern Charitable Income Tax Deduction
American tax law provides several incentives for individuals to engage in
charitable giving. In allowing a reduction in tax liability for charitable
contributions, Congress encourages taxpayers to support a wide range of activities
that the government does not directly assist. 32 The most common tax incentives are
provided through a deduction in the taxpayer’s liability for federal income taxes.
The general rule is that individuals are allowed itemized deductions on their
federal income tax returns for any charitable contributions made during the taxable
year. 33 There are limitations, however, not only on which charitable contributions
will qualify for a deduction, but also on the value of allowable deductions in any
given year. 34 Taxpayers who take the standard deduction, rather than itemizing, are
not eligible to deduct the value of any charitable contributions. 35 The majority of
taxpayers—roughly two-thirds—fall into this category and do not itemize. 36
Taxpayers who do itemize must meet several requirements to take advantage of
these incentives.
As an initial matter, the charitable contribution must be made to, or for the use
of, a qualifying recipient. 37 Section 170(c) of the Internal Revenue Code (the
32

See, e.g., Brinley v. Comm’r, 782 F.2d 1326, 1336 (5th Cir. 1986) (Hill, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]he practice of making charitable contributions is a most worthy attribute of
our society and should be encouraged since it aids in the accomplishment of many social
goals which our federal and local governments otherwise cannot or will not
accomplish . . . .”).
33
See I.R.C. § 170(a)(1). In most cases, however, donations of less than the donor’s
full interest in the property will not qualify for a charitable contribution deduction. Id.
§ 170(f)(3)(A). Certain partial interests in trust will qualify for the charitable deduction if
the requirements of section 170(f)(2) are followed. See id. § 170(f)(2). A charitable
contribution of the remainder interest of a charitable remainder annuity trust, a charitable
remainder unitrust, or pooled income fund, will qualify for a deduction. Id. § 170(f)(2)(A);
see also John G. Steinkamp, Decoding Estate Planning: A Review of Frequently Used
Acronyms, 2001 ARK. L. NOTES 73, 74–76 (providing a general overview of charitable
remainder annuity trust and charitable remainder unitrust). Likewise, a charitable
contribution of the lead income interest of a charitable lead annuity trust or charitable lead
unitrust will qualify. I.R.C. § 170(f)(2)(B).
34
The Internal Revenue Code also regulates valuation of charitable deductions and
may impose tax penalties in the event a taxpayer inflates the value of a donation. See I.R.C.
§ 6662 (2006) (discussing imposition of tax penalties generally).
35
The standard deduction arose out of the Individual Income Tax Act of 1944. Ellen
P. Aprill, Churches, Politics, and the Charitable Contribution Deduction, 42 B.C. L. REV.
843, 850 (2001).
36
See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 5, at 38 tbl.1.2.
37
See I.R.C. § 170(c) (2012) (discussing entities that may appropriately make use of
charitable contributions).
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Code) defines a charitable contribution to include contributions given to a state, or
any political subdivision of a state, “if the contribution or gift is made for
exclusively public purposes.” 38 A contribution to a corporation, trust, community
chest, fund, or foundation will also qualify for a deduction if the organization is
created or organized in the United States and “organized and operated exclusively
for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster
national or international amateur sports competition (but only if no part of its
activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for the
prevention of cruelty to children or animals.” 39 Contributions given directly to
individuals will not qualify for a deduction, and the donor cannot benefit directly
from the contribution made to the qualifying recipient. 40
In addition, Congress caps the amount of charitable contributions that may be
taken as a deduction in any given tax year. 41 These caps prevent taxpayers from
completely avoiding the payment of federal income tax by giving all of their
income to a qualifying charity. 42 At most, the amount allowed as a deduction may
reach 50% of the individual’s “contribution base.” 43 The amount of the cap
depends on the nature of the property contributed and the nature of the charitable
organization that receives the donation. 44
The Internal Revenue Code, of course, includes provisions designed to
encourage charitable giving beyond the individual income tax deduction.
38

Id. § 170(c)(1).
Id. § 170(c)(2)(A)–(B). In addition, any net earnings of the organization cannot
benefit any private shareholder or individual. Id. § 170(c)(2)(C). Moreover, the
organization cannot be “disqualified for tax exemption under section 501(c)(3) by reason of
attempting to influence legislation, and which does not participate in, or intervene in
(including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of
(or in opposition to) any candidate for public office.” Id. § 170(c)(2)(D).
40
Ottawa Silica Co. v. United States, 699 F.2d 1124, 1131 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
Furthermore, contributions are limited to donations of property; services rendered for a
charitable organization may not be deducted. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(g) (2010); see also
Lindsey, supra note 22, at 1057 n.2 (“The out-of-pocket expenses associated with the
provision of services are, however, deductible.”).
41
I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(B).
42
See J. MARTIN BURKE & MICHAEL K. FRIEL, TAXATION OF INDIVIDUAL INCOME
579 (8th ed. 2007).
43
I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A). “Contribution base” is generally equated by the IRS as the
taxpayer’s adjusted gross income. Id. § 170(b)(1)(G).
44
For most charitable contributions, the amount allowed as a deduction cannot exceed
50% of the taxpayer’s contribution base. Id. § 170(b)(1)(A). Caps imposed on capital-gain
property, as well as contributions to organization not listed in section 170(b)(1)(A), are
limited to 20% or 30% of a taxpayer’s contribution base. Id. §§ 170(b)(1)(C), (D)(i). For
further discussion of the deduction limits, see C. Eugene Steuerle & Martin A. Sullivan,
Toward More Simple and Effective Giving: Reforming the Tax Rules for Charitable
Contributions and Charitable Organizations, 12 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 399, 402–03 (1995).
39
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Corporations, likewise, have tax incentives to encourage charitable giving. 45 The
federal gift and estate tax system favors philanthropy by offering an unlimited
deduction for qualifying transfers to charitable organizations. 46 Federal tax law
also provides substantial oversight and regulation of the charitable organizations
themselves through its system of regulating the tax-exempt status afforded to
certain nonprofit organizations. 47 The Code lists the permissible purposes for
charitable organizations, 48 limits the private benefits of transactions in which they
engage, 49 and restricts the activities and investments of various types of charities. 50
These additional tax incentives are largely beyond the scope of this Article.
B. The History of the Charitable Income Tax Deduction
The charitable income tax deduction has a rich history that helps inform
current understanding of its justifications and structure. Notably, the tax incentive
for charitable donations has varied with respect to whom the incentive was
intended to reach: only very high-income taxpayers or a much broader swath of
society. It has also varied whether the tax benefit was available only to those who
itemize deductions or whether it was available to nonitemizers as well. It has been
remarkably consistent over time as to its structure, as a deduction from income
rather than a tax credit or other format. Other modifications to the deduction have
reflected concerns with providing sufficient incentive to make gifts while
minimizing opportunities for abuse.
The charitable contribution deduction is one of the oldest deductions
permitted from the income tax, first established through the War Revenue Act of
45

See I.R.C. § 170(d)(2). Section 170(c)(2) provides that charitable contributions by a
corporation can only be to those charitable organizations that operate “exclusively for
religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes, to foster national or
international amateur sports competition, or for the prevention of cruelty to children or
animals.” Id. § 170(c)(2). The amount of deductions allowed for corporations cannot
exceed 10% of the total amount of the corporation’s taxable income, determined without
regard to its charitable contributions. Id. § 170(b)(2)(C).
46
See id. §§ 2055, 2522.
47
See generally BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 3–25
(7th ed. 1998) (discussing the types of nonprofit organizations, their corresponding tax
statuses, and policy goals accomplished through tax exemption). It should be noted that
“[a] nonprofit organization is not necessarily a tax-exempt organization.” Id. at 4. The
scope of this Article does not apply to all nonprofit organizations, but only to the subset of
nonprofits that are eligible to receive contributions that would entitle the donor to an
income tax deduction under section 170 of the Code. All references to “charities,”
“charitable organizations,” or “nonprofits” used in this Article should be understood in that
vein.
48
I.R.C. § 501.
49
See id. § 501(c)(3).
50
Id. §§ 4941–4945.
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1917. 51 Under this original iteration of the deduction, taxpayers were permitted to
deduct up to 15% of net taxable income for contributions made during the year to
charitable organizations. 52 Because only individuals with higher incomes were
subject to the tax at all, only wealthier individuals were contemplated when the
deduction was created. 53 The motivations for the deduction were to incentivize
charitable giving in the face of lower disposable income triggered by the income
tax, and to counteract the anticipated drop in donations from wealthy individuals to
worthy organizations, specifically “institutions of higher learning.” 54
The charitable deduction changed significantly when Congress passed the
Individual Income Tax Act of 1944, which increased the number of individuals
subject to paying income tax by a multiple of almost fifteen. 55 Now that the
income tax reached far beyond the top twentieth of income earners, simplicity in
administration became a higher priority, and the standard deduction was created to
help simplify the process for new filers.56 Under the standard deduction, taxpayers
could deduct a set amount against income, representing typical cumulative
deductions, rather than track actual transactions triggering itemized deductions.
Because taxpayers who take the standard deduction are not also entitled to take
itemized deductions, some members of Congress (and charitable organizations)
raised concerns that the bill was unfair to lower-income taxpayers, who should also
benefit from a charitable tax incentive.57 This argument did not prevail, with
proponents of the bill arguing that tax deductions for lower-income taxpayers were
not the driving force behind donations 58 and that including a representation of
charitable giving within the standard deduction was sufficient. 59 The same Act that
established the standard deduction (eliminating the ability of nonitemizing
taxpayers to deduct their charitable contributions) increased the value of the
charitable deduction for higher-income taxpayers by tying the maximum
contribution to the higher “adjusted gross income” instead of the lower “net
51

War Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, § 1201(2), 40 Stat. 300, 330 (1917).
Id.
53
Aprill, supra note 35, at 849.
54
Id. “Senator Hollis . . . explained that the country had permitted institutions of
higher learning ‘to grow up and become firmly established on the plan of depending upon
private contributions’” and “feared that the war would affect colleges ‘more seriously than
it does any other character of institution.’” Id. While no mention was made of religious
groups, there are some records that indicate he was also concerned with the impact it could
have on them as well. Id.
55
Id. at 850. “Between 1939 and 1945, the coverage of the tax system grew from
about 5% to 74% of the population.” Id.
56
Alan L. Feld, Fairness in Rate Cuts in the Individual Income Tax, 68 CORNELL L.
REV. 429, 439–40 (1983). For further discussion on the decision to enact the standard
deduction, see H.R. REP. NO. 78-1365 (1944), and S. REP. NO. 78-885 (1944).
57
Aprill, supra note 35, at 850–52.
58
90 CONG. REC. 4704 (1944); see also C. HARRY KAHN, PERSONAL DEDUCTIONS IN
THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 46–47 (1960).
59
90 CONG. REC. 3973 (1944) (statement of Rep. Robertson).
52
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taxable income.” 60 Congress again increased the value of the deduction to higherincome itemizing taxpayers in 1952, adjusting the maximum contribution amount
from 15% to 20% adjusted gross income. 61
The charitable contribution deduction became section 170 of the Internal
Revenue Code in 1954. 62 At the same time, contribution caps were increased to
30% of adjusted gross income, but only for outright transfers (not those in trust),
and only for transfers to prioritized charitable recipients, including churches or
religious orders and educational institutions. 63 The change to the charitable
deduction was intended to encourage specific forms of giving to specific classes of
charities. 64 This was the first time that Congress had singled out some types of
organizations as being more worthy than others. 65
Major changes to the rules governing tax-exempt organizations and charitable
deductions were instituted through the Tax Reform Act of 1969. 66 Reacting to
perceived abusive transactions involving charities, Congress restructured the Code
to differentiate between public charities and private foundations, and it provided
more restrictive rules on operations of private foundations and donations to them. 67
60

See Individual Income Tax Act of 1944, 1 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) ¶ 328
(1944), at 2055.
61
2 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) ¶ 328 (1952).
62
Lindsey, supra note 22, at 1062.
63
Lindsey, supra note 22, at 1062–63 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 83-1337 (1954),
reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4017, 4190).
64
H.R. REP. NO. 83-1337, at 25–26 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4017,
4050–51.
65
See Lindsey, supra note 22, at 1063. Congress made various additional changes to
the charitable deduction throughout the 1950s and 1960s, attempting to tighten loopholes
and adjust caps on amounts taxpayers could deduct. Id. at 1063–64. In 1958, Congress
amended the tax code to disallow double deductions and ensure the value of deductions
was reduced by liabilities passing with the property. Technical Amendments Act of 1958,
Pub. L. No. 85-866, §§ 11–12, 72 Stat. 1606, 1609–10 (1958) (codified at scattered
sections of 21, 26, and 42 U.S.C.). In 1962, Congress added organizations to the list for
which a taxpayer would receive a 30% deduction and matched deductions more closely to
the amount actually donated to the charity. Lindsey, supra note 22, at 1064. In 1964,
Congress passed a bill that allowed for an unlimited charitable deduction to those taxpayers
who contributed at least 90% of their income for the taxable year in question and in eight
of the past ten years. H.R. REP. NO. 91-413, at 4, reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1645,
1698; William A. Drennan, Charitable Donations of Intellectual Property: The Case for
Retaining the Fair Market Value Tax Deduction, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 1045, 1061 n.53;
Lindsey, supra note 22, at 1064. The unlimited deduction was short lived, however, and
was slowly reduced to 50% of the taxpayer’s income by 1974. See 1 A PRACTITIONER’S
GUIDE TO THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969, at 74 (Miriam I. R. Eolis & Joseph S. Robinson
eds., 1970).
66
Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487, 492–98 (codified as
amended at I.R.C. § 509 (1976)).
67
See I.R.C. §§ 4941–4945 (2006) (imposing excise taxes on improper activities of
private foundations).
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Whereas contributions to public charities were generally capped at 50% of a
taxpayer’s income, contributions to private foundations were now capped at 20%
or 30%. 68 The same Act established additional rules restricting the value of
contributions of capital gain property, such as appreciated securities. 69
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 instituted a remarkable change to
the charitable deduction: between 1982 and 1986, the charitable deduction was
available to taxpayers who did not itemize deductions as well as to those who
did. 70 As a result of this amendment, for the first time “many low- and middle68

See I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(B) (2012) (imposing caps that prevent taxpayers from
completely avoiding the payment of federal income tax by giving all of their income to a
qualifying charity). These limitations place a cap on the amount allowed as a deduction; the
amount allowed as a deduction cannot exceed 50% of the individual’s “contribution base,”
which is generally the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income. See id. § 170(b)(1)(G). The
amount of the cap depends on the nature of the property contributed and the nature of the
charitable organization that receives the donation. Id. For most charitable contributions, the
amount allowed as a deduction cannot exceed 50% of the taxpayer’s contribution base. Id.
§ 170(b)(1)(A)(viii). Caps imposed on capital gain property, as well as contributions to
organizations not listed in section 170(b)(1)(A), like private foundations, are limited to
20% or 30% of a taxpayer’s contribution base. Id. §§ 170(b)(1)(C), (D)(i). Interesting to
note, the figure of 50% was arbitrarily picked following a conversation with President
Nixon, as that amount was the limit he always thought the law should allow for, and as
such, his cabinet members proposed that figure when presenting the proposal to the Ways
and Means Committee. C. Eugene Steuerle & Martin A. Sullivan, Toward More Simple
and Effective Giving: Reforming the Tax Rules For Charitable Contributions and
Charitable Organizations, 12 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 399, 410 (1995).
69
I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(C), (D)(i); see also Lindsey, supra note 22, at 1065–68. These
provisions were altered the most as Congress felt that the most abuse occurred from the
donation of appreciated property and stocks. Lindsey, supra note 22, at 1065–68; see also
Bialo v. Comm’r, 88 T.C. 1132, 1139 (1987) (disallowing the deduction of stock when it
was clear the intent of the taxpayer was to reduce his overall taxable liability through the
use of the charitable deduction). Arguably, the caps on deductions still allow for most
taxpayers to contribute a large portion of their income without feeling stifled in their choice
to donate and to meet their individual tax burden. See Steuerle & Sullivan, supra note 68,
at 410–11. That said, a study conducted by Teresa Odendahl found that most wealthy
donors “contribute up to the maximum for which they receive a deduction.” Id. at 411
(quoting Teresa Odendahl, Independent Foundations and Wealthy Donors: An Overview, in
AMERICA’S WEALTHY AND THE FUTURE OF FOUNDATIONS 1, 11 (Teresa Odendahl ed.,
1987)).
70
Economic Recovery Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 121, 95 Stat. 196 (1981);
H.R. REP. NO. 97-215, at 201–02 (1981) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N.
285, 291–92 (reporting on the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981). In addition to the
standard provisions found in section 170, Congress also placed dollar caps on the amount
each taxpayer could deduct for the respective years. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 97TH
CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY TAX ACT OF 1981, at 50;
see also H.R. REP. NO. 97-215, at 201–02.
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income taxpayers were able to claim the deduction.” 71 The amendment expired in
1986, and Congress has never since allowed taxpayers using the standard
deduction the option of also deducting donations made to charitable
organizations. 72 Instead, as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Congress enacted
changes that further expanded the use of the standard deduction as a means of
simplifying the tax system, and proponents for the greater use of the charitable
deduction by taxpayers could not stop that movement. 73 While the use of the
deduction by all taxpayers has never been revived, members of Congress and the
executive branch periodically reconsider its potential.74 The idea spreads across a
wide political spectrum, with both President Clinton and President Bush proposing
legislation during their terms in office that would allow nonitemizing taxpayers to
benefit from the charitable deduction. 75 The changes actually made to the
charitable deduction during the 1990s were modest and primarily centered on
ensuring the accuracy of taxpayer reporting. 76
More recent political movements suggest a contraction in the availability of
the charitable deduction to high-income taxpayers. 77 The 2013 Revenue Proposal
propagated by the Obama administration recommended reinstating the 36% and
39.6% tax brackets for high-income taxpayers but limiting the benefit of itemized
deductions—including the charitable deduction—to 28% of income. 78 The
Revenue Proposal also contemplated the revival of a tax provision capping the
overall value of most itemized deductions, including charitable donations, tying
71

Lindsey, supra note 22, at 1068. The amendment was temporary and was included
in the Act to allow the government to study the effect it had on influencing charitable
giving. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 70, at 49.
72
See Aprill, supra note 35, at 853; Lindsey, supra note 22, at 1069.
73
Ronald A. Pearlman, Repeal of Charitable Contributions for Nonitemizers
Explained, 28 TAX NOTES 1140, 1140 (1985).
74
See Aprill, supra note 35, at 854–55.
75
Id.
76
The changes included requiring taxpayers who wished to claim the deduction for
any contribution over $250 to have written confirmation of the donation, as well as
requiring organizations to provide donors written confirmation of contributions over $75 as
to what portion of the contribution was in money or property, as services rendered are not
deductible. See I.R.C. § 6115 (2006); Comm. Reports on Pub. L. No. 103-66 (Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993), 4 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) ¶ 11,600, at 25,850–56
(2002).
77
See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S
FISCAL YEAR 2013 REVENUE PROPOSALS 74 (2012), available at http://www.treasury.gov/r
esource-center/tax-policy/Documents/General-Explanations-FY2013.pdf. The proposal
limits all itemized deductions (not just charitable donations) to 28% and also limits other
tax advantages for those with incomes over $200,000 (married taxpayers over $250,000).
Id. at 67, 74.
78
The proposal would apply to taxpayers with over $250,000 if married and filing
jointly, and $200,000 otherwise. Id. at 70, 74.
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deductibility to a statutory floor. 79 The Revenue Proposal has been robustly
criticized on the grounds that limiting incentives to high-income taxpayers to give
is particularly troubling in an economic downturn and could threaten the vitality of
the third sector. 80
The evolution of the charitable deduction is in all likelihood still incomplete.
The history of the deduction reflects shifting standards as to whether the deduction
was to extend beyond high-income taxpayers and how strong or limited the
incentives for those taxpayers were to be. As the structure and value of the
charitable deduction is challenged, the strength of the tax policy underlying its
existence gains new importance. The power of the justifications for the charitable
contribution deduction informs the extent to which its structure should be
modified.
III. SCHOLARLY CRITIQUES OF THE CHARITABLE INCOME TAX DEDUCTION
The tax benefits afforded to charities have inspired a rich and varied literature.
Both critics and supporters have struggled to expose the theoretical underpinnings
of the charitable deduction. Scholars have developed several theories as to what
justifies a charitable income tax deduction and what goals the existence of the
deduction ought to further. 81 The following discussion outlines the main themes in
the academic literature.
A. What Should Charitable Tax Benefits Do, and How Are They Justified?
There is large consensus that the charitable income tax deduction represents
an indirect subsidy to charity and operates as a substitute for direct government
79

Under this rule, most itemized deductions are reduced by 3% of the amount by
which adjusted gross income is greater than a statutory floor (with an inflation index); the
overall reduction cannot exceed 80% of the value of the deductions. Id. at 67. The
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 and the Tax Relief,
Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010 provided
temporary relief from this rule from 2001–2012. But when the Tax Relief, Unemployment
Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act sunset at the end of 2012, the proposal did
not contemplate reinstating this relief. Id.
80
See Patrick E. Tolan, Jr., Compromising the Safety Net: How Limiting Tax
Deductions for High-Income Donors Could Undermine Charitable Organizations 55–63
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?articl
e=1007&context=patrick_tolan.
81
Many scholars address charitable tax subsidies collectively, considering not only
the charitable income tax deduction but also tax-exempt status, eligibility to issue taxexempt bonds, and other tax benefits. For purposes of this Article, the focus shall be the
contribution of scholarship to justifying the charitable income tax deduction.
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funding of public projects. 82 A deduction acts like a subsidy because the
government will forgo revenue in the amount of the deduction triggered by the
taxpayer’s contribution. For example, if a taxpayer in the 30% marginal rate
bracket makes a $1,000 contribution to her alma mater, the cost to the taxpayer is
only $700, as reduced by the $300 forgone revenue (and effective subsidy)
represented by the cost of the deduction. The tax structure “operate[s] like
matching grants.” 83 The charitable contribution deduction is therefore largely
understood as a tax expenditure. 84
Notwithstanding this consensus, some scholars instead argue that the
charitable deduction is central to the definition of income. 85 In a classic Harvard
Law Review article, Professor William Andrews pioneered the theory that income
ought only to include funds available for consumption. 86 Amounts given to charity,
not being available for consumption by the taxpayer, are therefore properly
excluded from income. 87 The charitable deduction, consequently, results in a more
accurate construction of ability to pay. 88 Although some scholars have challenged
and criticized this theory, 89 others persist in the belief that removing charitable
gifts from the tax base is necessary to reflect true income. 90
82

See Miranda Perry Fleischer, Equality of Opportunity and the Charitable Tax
Subsidies, 91 B.U. L. REV. 601, 608–09 (2011) (noting that the view that tax provisions
serve as subsidies to the charitable sector is widely accepted).
83
Ray D. Madoff, What Leona Helmsley Can Teach Us About the Charitable
Deduction, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 957, 965 (2010).
84
See Ilan Benshalom, The Dual Subsidy Theory of Charitable Deductions, 84 IND.
L.J. 1047, 1055–59 (2009). But see Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct.
1436, 1444 (2011) (distinguishing between tax credits and governmental expenditures).
85
See, e.g., William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86
HARV. L. REV. 309, 314–15, 346 (1972) (arguing that because the taxpayer does not
consume funds transferred to charity, they are not properly includable in income); Johnny
Rex Buckles, The Community Income Theory of the Charitable Contributions Deduction,
80 IND. L.J. 947, 972 (2005) (arguing that consumption by the community ought not be
construed as income).
86
Andrews, supra note 85, at 314–15, 346.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
See, e.g., Mark. P. Gergen, The Case for a Charitable Contribution Deduction, 74
VA. L. REV. 1393, 1421–26 (1998); Thomas D. Griffith, Theories of Personal Deductions
in the Income Tax, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 343, 345, 375–77 (1989).
90
See, e.g., Buckles, supra note 85, at 983–84. As Buckles puts it,
[E]ven if we characterize a person’s charitable contribution to the community as
a “withdrawal” from the private partnership that gives rise to positive
consumption, this amount should be offset by the negative consumption that
inheres in the contribution to the community partnership. The net result is no
income to the taxpayer. By reducing a taxpayer’s income subject to tax, the
charitable contributions deduction effectuates the same result.
Id.
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Regardless of which theory prevails, prudent tax policy dictates that society
ought to be getting some benefit out of the charitable deduction. 91 Scholars have
pinpointed several desirable consequences of the charitable deduction, and the
extent to which the deduction attains these goals has been debated. Specifically, as
a normative matter, the charitable deduction should be economically efficient,
incentivize charitable giving, produce horizontal and vertical equity, reflect and
promote pluralism, and provide incentive for donors to monitor charities. The
following discussion highlights the primary justifications and expected returns
relating to the charitable deduction. 92
1. Economic Efficiency
A primary justification given for the charitable income tax deduction is that it
is an economically efficient way to allow collective action for the benefit of the
public. Professor Mark Gergen, for example, has argued that under the KaldorHicks conception of efficiency (that a social policy is efficient if the societal gains
from its adoption more than offset the losses), charitable deductions are efficient to
the extent that “the dollar gain to beneficiaries from moving towards an optimal
level of funding for the charity is greater than the dollar loss to the disinterested.” 93
Moreover, the charitable tax deduction may be necessary to allow efficient pooling
of resources to pursue goals hampered by a collective-action problem. 94
91

The tax benefit is arguably more critical if the subsidy theory is correct and less so
if the income theory prevails.
92
This Article does not exhaustively discuss the theoretical underpinnings of the
charitable deduction, since the primary goal of this Article is to augment the charitable
deduction with an FSA. Regardless of how the charitable deduction is justified, so long as
there is some valid justification, the only difference is structural: whether the value of the
deduction is realized through an FSA (and reached by itemizers and nonitemizers) or
realized through the present itemized deduction process. That said, modern movements are
expanding the justifications for the charitable deduction beyond the traditional notions of
efficiency, pluralism, incentives, and monitoring to include important themes like
distributive justice and critical race theory. For a discussion on distributive justice, see
Miranda Perry Fleischer, Theorizing the Charitable Tax Subsidies: The Role of Distributive
Justice, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 505 (2010), and Fleischer, supra note 82, at 620. For a
discussion on critical race theory, see David A. Brennen, A Diversity Theory of Charitable
Tax Exemption—Beyond Efficiency, Through Critical Race Theory, Toward Diversity, 4
PITT. TAX REV. 1, 11 (2006).
93
Gergen, supra note 89, at 1412–13.
94
Professor Gergen explains,
The virtue of private giving is that it enables smaller groups to act collectively
without having to secure direct government expenditures for the good through
the political process. If there is a high preference minority and a relatively
indifferent majority, a tax subsidy for private funding of the good may be the
only way to fund the good at the level the minority desires. Left to its own
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Under this theory, the charitable tax deduction creates economic efficiencies
by funding public goods or services that the market and government fail to provide
in adequate quantities. 95 Government, constrained by its political reliance upon the
financial priorities of the median voter, is unable to fund public projects favored
only by a minority. 96 Private action likewise fails if the endeavor lacks sufficient
financial reward or if collective-action barriers prove too difficult to overcome. 97
The charitable income tax deduction, therefore, allows partial funding (to the
extent of the forgone revenue at marginal tax rates) when full governmental
financing would provide too much of the good or service and private financing
would produce too little. Whereas direct grants from the government would result
in the cost being shared without reference to whether a taxpayer values the project,
a charitable tax deduction results in the bulk of the financial burden resting with
those who value it enough to contribute, with a smaller fraction allocated to the
general public. 98 This leveraging of private dollars with federal funding results in
an efficient way to bear the cost of public goods and services. 99
2. Incentivizing Charitable Gifts
To achieve this efficiency, the deduction is expected to induce taxpayers to
increase donations. 100 A primary goal of the charitable deduction is to reward
devices without a tax subsidy, the minority may not be able to overcome its
freerider problems to provide the appropriate amount of the good.
Id. at 1399. To simplify (although as Professor Gergen liked to remind his students, he has
already “done the heavy lifting here”), groups of people often fail to allocate resources
appropriately due to human tendencies like greed, laziness, or selfishness. Sometimes
collaboration needs a little push.
95
See Fleischer, supra note 82, at 611 (citing JOHN D. COLOMBO & MARK A. HALL,
THE CHARITABLE TAX EXEMPTION 100–08 (1995)); Gergen, supra note 89, at 1396–406;
Burton A. Weisbrod, Toward a Theory of the Voluntary Nonprofit Sector in a Three-Sector
Economy, in THE ECONOMICS OF NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS 21, 21–40 (Susan RoseAckerman ed., 1986).
96
Miranda Perry Fleischer, Generous to a Fault? Fair Shares and Charitable Giving,
93 MINN. L. REV. 165, 167–68 (2008).
97
Gergen, supra note 89, at 1399.
98
Id. at 1399–406.
99
There are, however, limits to the efficiency analysis with respect to charitable
giving. For example, we cannot precisely determine what the optimal burden should be that
is borne by the donor as opposed to the public, and the amount established by marginal
income tax rates may be underinclusive or overinclusive. At a minimum, the efficiency
theory provides some justification for permitting individuals to deduct contributions to
charities.
100
Todd Izzo, Comment, A Full Spectrum of Light: Rethinking the Charitable
Contribution Deduction, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 2371, 2372–73 (1993) (“Empirical research
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generosity and encourage charitable giving. 101 As Professor David Schizer explains
in his recent article, Subsidizing Charitable Contributions: Incentives, Information,
and the Private Pursuit of Public Goals, a charitable deduction is needed to
“persuade donors to be more generous.” 102 In the absence of a tax benefit,
“potential funders sometimes free ride, withholding support even from programs
they favor, hoping others will pick up the slack,” and may conceal their ability to
pay and their “true level of generosity.” 103 The charitable deduction, then, provides
an incentive to indulge in philanthropy rather than suppress generosity in the hopes
others will bear the costs.
The extent to which the charitable deduction increases charitable gifts is hard
to quantify, although several attempts have been made to determine the impact of
the deduction on behavior. 104 Studies have had mixed results, but most indicate
that the elasticity of charitable giving—how donations change in relationship to the
tax rate—is positive. 105 These metrics generally suggest that the charitable
deduction does in fact incentivize charitable giving and quantitatively increase
taxpayer giving behavior among those who qualify for the deduction.106 The
impact of the charitable tax deduction on the giving behavior of nonitemizing
taxpayers is harder to assess, 107 although there is some indication that taxpayers of
all income levels are or would be motivated by charitable tax subsidies. 108
bears out the assumption that the existence of a deduction will induce taxpayers, on
average, to increase their contributions rather than simply pocketing the tax savings.”).
101
See generally David M. Schizer, Subsidizing Charitable Contributions: Incentives,
Information, and the Private Pursuit of Public Goals, 62 TAX L. REV. 221 (2009) (citing
three rationales for charitable giving subsidies: encouraging generosity, reflecting the true
funding preferences of the public, and monitoring quality of charitable organizations).
102
Id. at 229.
103
Id.
104
See Lilian V. Faulhaber, The Hidden Limits of the Charitable Deduction: An
Introduction to Hypersalience, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1307, 1319 (2012) (collecting sources).
105
See Faulhaber, supra note 104, at 1319. Professor Faulhaber notes that studies
“generally find an elasticity above zero,” meaning that individuals do change behavior in
response to the rate change—and even sometimes report an elasticity above one, which
would indicate an increase in giving that exceeded the tax savings attributable to the tax
rate. Id.
106
Id. at 1318.
107
See Aprill, supra note 35, at 857; Faulhaber, supra note 104, at 1332. In addition
to noting that studies have struggled with assessing elasticity for nonitemizing taxpayers if
the benefit were extended to them, Faulhaber argues that the charitable deduction may
impact the elasticity of nonitemizers when the benefits are not extended to them, because
the hypersalience of the charitable deduction leads these taxpayers to mistakenly believe
they do benefit from the deduction. Faulhaber, supra note 104, at 1332.
108
See Alice Gresham Bullock, Taxes, Social Policy and Philanthropy: The Untapped
Potential of Middle- and Low-Income Generosity, 6 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 325, 339–
40 (1997) (noting that “[i]t is generally accepted that the incentive tax effect of the
charitable contributions deduction is relatively high for high-income taxpayers,” that
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Some scholars have argued that a charitable contribution deduction is not
necessary to encourage charitable donations or, at least, that it is not as central as
much scholarship assumes. 109 In What Leona Helmsley Can Teach Us About the
Charitable Deduction, Professor Ray Madoff discusses the current status and
shortcomings of the charitable deduction. 110 Although the charitable contribution
deduction seems well ensconced, Professor Madoff points out that “[f]or most of
history, charitable giving has occurred independent of any government support.” 111
Another counterargument to the idea that strong tax incentives are central to the
survival of the nonprofit sector is the fact that many other countries do not rely on
tax subsidies at all. 112 Despite these counterarguments, the expectation that the
charitable deduction will incentivize and reward charitable giving is a common
justification for its role in the tax code.
3. Equity
Another argument in favor of the charitable deduction rests on equitable
concerns. There is “general agreement” that a critical principle used to evaluate
any tax system is equity, both horizontal and vertical. 113 Horizontal equity dictates
that taxpayers in similar situations should be taxed similarly, while vertical equity
maintains that one should be taxed based upon his or her ability to pay. 114
Donating property to charity reduces one’s ability to pay tax because the
assets are no longer available for the taxpayer’s private consumption or enjoyment.
It is therefore argued that charitable donors “are thereby made less well-off and so
should pay less tax than people who spend their resources on personal
consumption.” 115 The argument is amplified by the consideration that some
taxpayers may feel morally compelled to make charitable contributions—such as a
religiously mandated tithe—so the extent to which the reduction in ability to pay is
voluntary is questionable. 116 The horizontal equity concerns, raised due to the
“empirical studies support the view that the charitable behavior of low- and middle-income
taxpayers is affected by the price of giving,” and that “the charitable behavior of low- and
middle-income taxpayers is indeed sensitive to the tax incentive”).
109
See, e.g., Madoff, supra note 83, at 957.
110
Id. at 964–67. Professor Madoff’s analysis and critique addresses not just the
income tax charitable deduction, but also the estate tax charitable deduction. Id.
111
Id.
112
See Alyssa A. DiRusso, American Nonprofit Law in Comparative Perspective, 10
WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 39, 83 (2011) (“Few other countries share America’s
commitment to tax as the center of nonprofit law. In some countries, tax plays no role at
all.”).
113
STEPHANIE J. WILLBANKS, FEDERAL TAXATION OF WEALTH TRANSFERS 10 (3d ed.
2012).
114
Id.
115
Gergen, supra note 89, at 1426.
116
Boris I. Bittker, Charitable Contributions: Tax Deductions or Matching Grants?
28 TAX L. REV. 37, 58–59 (1972).
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decrease in ability to pay following charitable contributions, have been used to
support arguments for the charitable deduction itself and for the exclusion of
amounts donated to charity from income. 117
The charitable deduction has also been criticized for its failure to incorporate
notions of vertical equity appropriately. 118 Although tax burden ought to be tied to
ability to pay, 119 the charitable deduction decreases the overall tax liability of those
most able to pay, without providing any tax benefit to those least able to pay. The
flaw is due to its characteristics as an itemized deduction; its benefits are not
available to lower-income taxpayers who do not itemize. Perhaps this flaw is
somehow offset by the fact that some charitable contributions will inure to the
benefit of those who are less well off, even though those who are better off receive
the benefit of the deduction.
4. Pluralism
Pluralism is another common justification for the existence and structure of
the charitable income tax deduction. Some commentators take the position that the
charitable tax subsidy is justified by the pluralistic nature of American society, in
that it allows a variety of taxpayers with a variety of views and priorities to
participate in funding decisions. In Taxes as Ballots, Professor Saul Levmore
argues that the charitable deduction allows individuals to “vote” with their dollars
as to which projects merit funding, allowing the government to follow those
favored projects with a matching subsidy. 120 Although the progressive effect of the
deduction, and its inaccessibility by nonitemizers, prevents the system from being
a “one-person one-vote ideal,” a wide variety of taxpayer perspectives still exists
and helps direct government funds. 121 The deduction helps ensure that a variety of
priorities will be funded by providing a platform for support unhampered by the
majoritarian demands of the democratic political process. 122
Diversity considerations support robust charitable tax subsidies that
contemplate a broad range of public and private interests. 123 The existence of a
variety of charities, funded by a variety of donors, “promote[s] pluralism and
117

See Tolan, Jr., supra note 80, at 15–18.
See, e.g., Bullock, supra note 108, at 343–45; Izzo, supra note 100, at 2373, 2390.
119
WILLBANKS, supra note 113, at 10; see also Susan Pace Hamill, An Argument for
Tax Reform Based on Judeo-Christian Ethics, 54 ALA. L. REV. 1, 46–47, 47 nn.148–49
(2002) (providing a summary of taxation policy influences).
120
Saul Levmore, Taxes as Ballots, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 387, 405 (1998).
121
Id. at 388–89, 405.
122
See Gregg D. Polsky, Rationally Cutting Tax Expenditures, 50 LOUISVILLE L. REV.
643, 648–49 (2012).
123
Brennen, supra note 92, at 4.
118
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diversity.” 124 The charitable deduction not only supports pluralism, but it also
disperses power among a variety of donors. 125
5. Incentivizing Donors to Monitor Charities
The charitable deduction is also critical to the method by which charities are
overseen. By incentivizing people to put their money in the hands of charitable
organizations, the deduction creates motivation for those stakeholders to monitor
the charity’s use of those funds. The existence of the deduction effectively
“recruits” individuals who now have a stake in the organization to oversee its
activities. 126 Donors play an important oversight role in culling information to
ferret out impropriety at nonprofits. 127 Donors care how their money is used, and
“[m]embers of the public are more likely to seek out records of the publicly
supported charities to which they have donated . . . and thereby monitor the
charities themselves.” 128 Larger and more influential donors may not only monitor
but effectively shape charities, such as through venture philanthropy. 129
Other aspects of tax law also indicate that incentivizing public surveillance is
critical to the effective monitoring of tax-exempt organizations. Charities are
subject to the public-disclosure requirements of section 6104(d) of the Internal
Revenue Code. 130 These regulations require charities to reveal their informational
returns (which include detailed financial information about the organization) to
members of the public. The ability of donors and the public to monitor charities
effectively depends upon access to this information.131 The disclosure requirements
124

Rob Atkinson, Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C. L. REV. 501, 605

(1990).
125

Paul R. McDaniel, Federal Matching Grants for Charitable Contributions: A
Substitute for the Income Tax Deduction, 27 TAX L. REV. 377, 390 (1972).
126
Schizer, supra note 101, at 256.
127
See Susan N. Gary, Regulating the Management of Charities: Trust Law,
Corporate Law, and Tax Law, 21 U. HAW. L. REV. 593, 647 (1999). In favor of increased
public disclosure to aid in protecting charities against fiduciary abuse, she noted that
“[e]asier public access to information, more effective disclosure, and for certain
transactions, increased disclosure, will help.” Id. at 639.
128
See Alyssa A. DiRusso, Supporting the Supporting Organization: The Potential
and Exploitation of 509(a)(3) Charities, 39 IND. L. REV. 207, 246 (2006).
129
Schizer, supra note 101, at 256–62.
130
I.R.C. § 6104(d) (2006). Certain types of charities, such as hospitals and other
health-care organizations, are also regulated outside of the tax system. For a discussion of
how transparency and disclosure are used to regulate the health-care industry, see William
M. Sage, Regulating Through Information: Disclosure Laws and American Healthcare, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 1701 (1999).
131
See Nina J. Crimm, A Case Study of a Private Foundation’s Governance and SelfInterested Fiduciaries Calls for Further Regulation, 50 EMORY L.J. 1093, 1188 (2001)
(“To enhance the standards of accountability, states and the federal government should
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increase the probability that improper financial dealings will be revealed, since not
only the IRS but now also the public and the media may access these records. 132
The charitable deduction, therefore, engages donors in monitoring behavior of
nonprofits that seek deductible donations. 133
B. How Should Charitable Tax Benefits Be Structured?
Even among scholars who believe that providing tax incentives relating to
charities is justified one way or the other, there is wide disagreement as to how
such a tax benefit is best structured. Whereas some would maintain the charitable
deduction in its current form, others would make modest or radical changes. 134 The
charitable deduction has recently been criticized on hypersalience grounds.
Professor Lilian Faulhaber has argued that the charitable deduction is
hypersalient—taxpayers are unusually well aware of it and overestimate its
application. 135 Because of the hypersalience of the deduction, lower-income
taxpayers, who receive no benefit from charitable tax subsidies because they do
not itemize, may alter their behavior in response to a tax incentive that does not
apply to them. 136 As Professor Faulhaber explains, exploiting tax illiteracy fosters
mistrust and may be economically inefficient in the long run, even if it results in
U.S. Department of the Treasury savings by incentivizing taxpayer behavior
without paying for it. 137 Because some taxpayers believe they are benefiting from a
deduction from which they are not, 138 and some taxpayers believe that the tax
benefit is a dollar-for-dollar credit, 139 the current structure and implementation of
the charitable deduction does not seem ideal.
consider reforming the types of information and format of data required to be disclosed at
[a] foundations’ formation, application for tax exempt status, and annually thereafter.”).
132
For an argument that the public disclosure requirements are insufficient to
motivate public monitoring in the supporting organization context, see DiRusso, supra note
128, at 207, 246–50.
133
Part of the reason private foundations are subject to additional restrictions on their
activities backed by excise taxes is that they lack the rigorous oversight by donors that
public charities are expected to have. Cockerline Mem’l Fund v. Comm’r, 86 T.C. 53, 64–
65 (1986) (“Public charities are exempt from private foundation treatment and,
consequently, the excise taxes, on the theory that public scrutiny arising from a
foundation’s dependence upon public funds will prevent abusive acts by the foundation.”).
134
Among the more radical proposals in the literature is the proposal to afford forprofit businesses tax benefits similar to those offered to charities, to the extent they pursue
charitable goals. See Anup Malani & Eric A. Posner, The Case for For-Profit Charities, 93
VA. L. REV. 2017, 264–67 (2007). This proposal has been heartily critiqued. See generally
Brian Galle, Keep Charities Charitable, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1213 (2010).
135
See Faulhaber, supra note 104, at 1319–20.
136
Id. at 1340–41.
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
Id. at 1321 n.66.
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Some scholars have argued that the charitable deduction ought to be replaced
by a credit for which all taxpayers would be eligible. 140 In Taxes, Social Policy and
Philanthropy: The Untapped Potential of Middle- and Low-Income Generosity,
Professor Alice Bullock criticizes the charitable income tax deduction for
disproportionately benefiting higher-income taxpayers and disproportionately
representing their views. 141 Noting that the charitable deduction provides a more
valuable subsidy for a taxpayer in a higher bracket than one in a lower bracket and
a nonexistent subsidy for a nonitemizer, Professor Bullock calls the charitable
deduction an “upside-down subsidy.” 142 She argues that lower- and middle-income
taxpayers would be spurred to increase giving by charitable tax incentives, 143 and
she proposes a direct credit as a substitute for the charitable deduction. 144 Others
140

The credit versus deduction debate is far from settled. See Fleischer, supra note 92,
at 522 n.87 (citing Jeff Strnad, The Charitable Contribution Deduction: A PoliticoEconomic Analysis, in THE ECONOMICS OF NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS, supra note 95, at
265, 272–76 (supporting a deduction), and Harold M. Hochman & James D. Rodgers, The
Optimal Tax Treatment of Charitable Contributions, in THE ECONOMICS OF NONPROFIT
INSTITUTIONS, supra note 95, at 224, 236 (supporting a credit)).
141
Bullock, supra note 108, at 343–44. Bullock argues,
Under the tax code, the high-income group wields a disproportionate amount of
power and influence in shaping institutions and their priorities. On the other
hand, the Internal Revenue Code neither encourages nor subsidizes middle- and
low-income taxpayers through the tax law, and it thus fails to confer a benefit
for the public good.
Id. at 344–45 (citations omitted).
142
Id. at 330; see also Faulhaber, supra note 104, at 1318 (noting that “many
commentators, starting with Surrey,” consider the charitable deduction to be an upsidedown subsidy (citing STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE CONCEPT OF
TAX EXPENDITURES 134–36 (1973))).
143
Bullock, supra note 108, at 339–40. Bullock further adds,
[E]mpirical studies support the view that the charitable behavior of low- and
middle-income taxpayers is affected by the price of giving. The contradictory
conclusions about the effect of tax incentives on middle- and low-income
taxpayers are a function of bias inherent in the models used for estimating the
effect of the tax deduction. It appears that when adjustments are made to
eliminate this identified bias, the findings support the conclusions that the
charitable behavior of low- and middle-income taxpayers is indeed sensitive to
the tax incentive.
Id. at 340 (citations omitted).
144
Id. at 356–59.
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have likewise argued that a credit is a more equitable tax incentive across income
lines than is a charitable deduction. 145
Credits may also enhance pluralism, as compared to a charitable deduction. A
tax incentive that extends to a broader segment of society and a greater variety of
donors should lead to a greater variety of nonprofits that benefit from
contributions. As Professor Levmore has noted, scholarship on the role of
pluralism in the charitable deduction often argues that a credit (or matching-grant)
structure is superior to an itemized deduction
because nonitemizers would be given a voice, because low-bracket
taxpayers would be as empowered as high-bracket taxpayers, because
donors whose contributions were modest in absolute terms but quite
impressive in relative, or wealth-corrected, terms could gain influence as
well, and because private giving in the aggregate would be encouraged
by empowering modest donors. 146
Professor Miranda Fleischer has recently argued that a credit may be superior
to a deduction (except to the extent budget constraints mandate a cap) from the
perspective of distributive justice. 147 In terms of equality of opportunity and
granting equal voice to citizens of diverse incomes, a credit is superior to a
deduction. 148 Even though a credit may not be the most economically efficient
approach—as it may provide a tax incentive to lower-income taxpayers who would
have given in the absence of a tax incentive—it is superior to a deduction in its
ability to “ensure that one’s ability to vote via charitable giving doesn’t depend on
income.” 149
Others have argued that lower-income nonitemizers should not be entitled to
an additional tax benefit for contributions to charity because the standard
deduction already assumes a baseline charitable contribution. Professor Ellen
Aprill, for example, has argued that
to permit nonitemizers to deduct all charitable contributions, without a
floor or some adjustment to the standard deduction, would give these
taxpayers, in effect, a double deduction and put them in a position better
145

See, e.g., Izzo, supra note 100, at 2373, 2390, 2398 (arguing that the current
charitable deduction is inequitable because it gives higher-income taxpayers greater power
in selecting how public money is spent).
146
Levmore, supra note 120, at 404 n.54.
147
Fleischer, supra note 82, at 662. “The best solution, therefore, would be to
determine a refundable credit large enough to provide the desired amount of incentives to
the better-off.” Id.
148
Id. at 661–62.
149
Id. at 662.
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than rather than equal to itemizers. Equity, like efficiency, requires some
kind of floor beneath nonitemizer deductions. 150
Professor Aprill, however, recognizes the equitable consequences of denying
a direct charitable incentive to lower-income nonitemizers. 151 Citing several
studies, Professor Aprill points out that the character of charitable recipients is
different for higher-income individuals than lower-income ones. 152 Specifically,
lower-income taxpayers most often select religious organizations as recipients of
their charitable contributions. 153 Higher-income individuals, on the other hand,
more often choose to benefit private foundations and educational institutions. 154
Disparate tax incentives, therefore, affect not only what classes of individuals are
rewarded for donating but also what types of nonprofits benefit from such
donations.
The current charitable deduction has sufficient weaknesses that warrant
exploration of alternatives to its current structure and implementation. An ideal
charitable incentive would better embrace the policies underlying the deduction,
most notably pluralism and equity. Flexible spending accounts offer a better way.
IV. FLEXIBLE SPENDING ACCOUNTS: THE MEDICAL FSA MODEL
The literature relating to tax subsidies for charitable giving generally assumes
that we are tied to one of three alternatives: a credit, a deduction, or neither. There
is, however, a fourth alternative: a flexible spending account. FSAs combine the
inclusiveness of a credit with the lower cost of a deduction. They are inclusive
(and demonstrate horizontal equity) because they are available to lower-income
nonitemizers and higher-income itemizers alike. 155 They support a pluralistic
approach to funding because participants from a wide variety of backgrounds are
included. Importantly, they are structured in a way that makes enhanced pluralism
150

Aprill, supra note 35, at 868.
Id. at 846.
152
Id. at 846, 868.
153
Id. One study indicated that gifts to churches and similar religious organizations
constituted over three-fourths of all charitable contributions made by taxpayers with
income under $40,000. Id.
154
Madoff, supra note 83, at 966 (“While most Americans direct their charitable
dollars to religious organizations, approximately three quarters of all bequests reported on
estate tax returns go either to private foundations or educational institutions.”); see also
Miranda Perry Fleischer, Charitable Contributions in an Ideal Estate Tax, 60 TAX L. REV.
263, 303 (2007) (noting the extent to which educational institutions benefit from donations
from wealthy individuals).
155
FSAs are more inclusive than itemized deductions, but as they are available only to
families with at least one employee, they are not all-inclusive. Unemployed individuals
cannot access this benefit because it is administered through an employer, and not all
employers offer FSAs.
151
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and equity affordable. Because flexible spending accounts are funded with pretax
income, they have the economic impact of a deduction (the qualifying amount
multiplied by the taxpayer’s marginal rate) as opposed to the dollar-for-dollar
setoff (the entire qualifying amount) of a credit. This makes the FSA model an
attractive and affordable way to extend the benefits of charitable tax subsidies to
nonitemizers.
The framework for the charitable flexible spending account is identical to that
used for medical flexible spending arrangements. For that reason, it is important to
analyze and understand the model and the reasons it evolved. Many parallels exist
between the tax policies supporting expenditures for health care and those
supporting expenditures for charity, so it is useful to track the path—and relative
success—of the health-care expense model.
A. Before (and Alongside) Medical Flexible Spending Arrangements: The Itemized
Deduction for Medical Expenses
Like tax incentives for donations to charity, support for medical expenses
incurred by taxpayers is funded by a deduction for qualifying expenses. This
deduction provides basic support for taxpayers who have faced costs relating to
health care and serves to shift the burden of incurring these expenses away from
the taxpayer individually and toward the public and government.
Section 213 of the Internal Revenue Code allows taxpayers to deduct certain
unreimbursed expenses for medical care of the taxpayer or the taxpayer’s spouse or
dependents. 156 Expenses for “medical care” include payments for “the diagnosis,
cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, or for the purpose of affecting
any structure or function of the body”; 157 transportation needed for such medical
care; 158 certain long-term-care expenses; 159 and qualifying health-care insurance
and long-term-care insurance costs. 160 Expenses are deductible only to the extent
156

The Code provides that “[t]here shall be allowed as a deduction the expenses paid
during the taxable year, not compensated for by insurance or otherwise, for medical care of
the taxpayer, his spouse, or a dependent . . . to the extent that such expenses exceed 7.5
percent of adjusted gross income.” I.R.C. § 213(a) (2012). Treasury regulations emphasize
that only costs actually paid during a taxable year are deductible. Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(a)
(as amended in 1979). They also provide additional guidance on what costs are qualifying
medical expenses or related transportation expenses. Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(1) (as
amended in 1979). There is no limitation on the amount of medical expenses that may
qualify. Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(c) (as amended in 1979). Note also that neither the
alternative minimum tax nor the 2% limit on miscellaneous itemized deductions applies.
See I.R.C. §§ 67–68.
157
I.R.C. § 213(d)(1)(A).
158
Id. § 213(d)(1)(B).
159
Id. § 213(d)(1)(C).
160
Id. § 213(d)(1)(D). The deduction is also allowed for costs of prescribed drugs or
insulin. Id. § 213(b).
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they exceed 7.5% of a taxpayer’s adjusted gross income. 161 Courtesy of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, this floor rose to 10% in 2013. 162
The deduction for medical expenses is a below-the-line deduction, meaning
that it is only available to taxpayers who itemize deductions. Because only onethird of taxpayers do itemize, the deduction is a nullity for the majority of the
population. 163 Coupled with the percentage limitations that render all but the most
catastrophic costs ineligible, this deduction lacks the teeth it needs to provide
substantial support for health-care costs. The deduction, therefore, is supplemented
by several additional tax subsidies in the Code. 164
B. The Evolution of Medical Flexible Spending Arrangements
Although a variety of tax subsidies for medical care existed for many decades,
their efficacy fell short. Because of the holes in the various provisions—the hefty
caps on itemizing medical expenses and the costs of medical care not covered by
insurance—taxpayers still found themselves with substantial financial burdens
relating to health care. 165 An important recent development provides some relief:
the medical flexible spending arrangement (MFSA). An MFSA is a tax-advantaged
161

I.R.C. § 213(a) (2006).
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 9013(a), 124
Stat. 119, 868 (2010) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 213(a) (2012)).
163
See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 5, at 38 tbl.1.2 (noting that only 33% of
taxpayers itemized their deductions in 2010).
164
The Code also, notably, provides subsidies for employer-provided health
insurance. See I.R.C. §§ 105–106. These provisions exclude payments employees receive
from health insurance plans from gross income. Id. A substantial majority of employees are
offered health-care benefits through their employer, although lower-income individuals are
less likely to receive coverage than those with higher incomes. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR,
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, NATIONAL COMPENSATION SURVEY, MARCH 2010,
MEDICAL CARE BENEFIT COMBINATIONS: ACCESS, PRIVATE INDUSTRY WORKERS tbl.42
(2010), available at http://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/benefits/2010/ownership/private/table40a
.pdf. Health savings accounts also offer useful benefits to some taxpayers. Health savings
accounts were introduced as part of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and
Modernization Act of 2003 and are specifically exempt from compensation deferment
limits found in section 125(d)(2)(D) of the Code. See Medicare Prescription Drug
Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 1201, 117 Stat. 2066
(2003) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 13995 and creating section 223 of the Code). Employee
contributions to a health savings account are treated as an above-the-line deduction. I.R.C.
§§ 62(a)(19), 223(a).
165
See Kelly Phillips Erb, Deduct This: The History of Medical Expenses Deduction,
FORBES (June 20, 2011), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyphillipserb/2011/06/20/deductthis-the-history-of-the-medical-expenses-deduction/ (discussing the development of the
medical expense deductions); U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., LIFETIME &
ANNUAL LIMITS, http://www.hhs.gov/healthcare/rights/limits/index.html (last visited Mar.
7, 2014) (describing generally the insurance company practice of setting limits on a
policyholder’s medical care and the effects of the Affordable Care Act).
162
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account that functions as an additional level of health insurance. 166 An MFSA is
essentially a “tax-planning mechanism” that, if used effectively, can help a
participant lower her overall financial burden for the calendar year. 167 The
legislative history surrounding the establishment of MFSAs shows that (1) the
purpose of flexible spending account legislation was to provide a financial
incentive to plan for unforeseen medical expenses that arose during the year, and
(2) earned income was not a primary motivator behind the introduction of the
legislation. 168
Medical flexible spending arrangements are authorized by section 125 of the
Code but are detailed in proposed Treasury regulations. 169 Section 125 allows
“cafeteria plans”—employment benefits that are structured for favorable tax
treatment. If a benefit constitutes an allowable selection under an employer’s
cafeteria plan, the value of that benefit is not included in the employee’s gross
income. 170 A cafeteria plan is “a written plan under which—(A) all participants are
employees, and (B) the participants may choose among 2 or more benefits
consisting of cash and qualified benefits.” 171 Benefits under a cafeteria plan may
not include deferred compensation, 172 and benefits must not discriminate in favor
of highly compensated employees. 173 Qualified benefits under a cafeteria plan
include only benefits that are “not includible in the gross income of the employee
166

Health FSAs “must qualify as accident and health plans.” Employee Benefits—
Cafeteria Plans, 72 Fed. Reg. 43,938, 43,958 (proposed Aug. 6, 2007) (to be codified at 26
C.F.R. pt. 1).
167
Vickie L. Hampton et al., The Effect of Education on Participation in Flexible
Spending Accounts, 4 FIN. COUNSELING & PLANNING 95, 98 (1993).
168
Adam Chodorow, Charitable FSAs: A Proposal to Combine Healthcare and
Charitable Giving Tax Provisions, 2011 BYU L. REV. 1041, 1046.
169
Prior to the recent health-care legislation, FSAs were exclusively within the
purview of the regulations and were not even mentioned in the Code itself. The Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act amended section 125 of the Code to establish a new
paragraph (i), establishing the following “Limitation on health flexible spending
arrangements”:
For purposes of this section, if a benefit is provided under a cafeteria plan
through employer contributions to a health flexible spending arrangement, such
benefit shall not be treated as a qualified benefit unless the cafeteria plan
provides that an employee may not elect for any taxable year to have salary
reduction contributions in excess of $2,500 made to such arrangement.
I.R.C. § 125(i)(1). The Code will adjust this contribution cap for inflation in $50
increments. Id. § 125(i)(2).
170
Id. § 125(a).
171
Id. § 125(d)(1).
172
Id. § 125(d)(2) (providing exceptions in only limited circumstances).
173
Id. § 125(c).
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by reason of an express provision of this chapter” 174 but also include “any other
benefit permitted under regulations.” 175
Proposed Treasury regulations provide significant guidance as to how an
MFSA may be operated within the requirements for cafeteria plans. The
regulations define a flexible spending arrangement to be “a benefit program that
provides employees with coverage which reimburses specified, incurred
expenses.” 176 These programs allow employees to forgo additional cash or taxable
benefits (such as additional salary) in exchange for benefits under the cafeteria
plan—in this case, participation in an MFSA. 177 Employers may also choose to
make certain contributions to these accounts. 178
Traditionally, there were no federally determined limits on the amount of
pretax dollars employees could contribute from their paychecks to cover qualified
expenses, although employers often set a cap. 179 The regulations do require a
cafeteria plan to specify the maximum salary reduction the employer chooses to
permit, but the employer could set that maximum. 180 Beginning in 2013, however,
federal law has capped contributions to an MFSA at $2,500, as indexed for
inflation. 181
MFSAs allow reimbursement of certain expenses only during the plan
period, 182 which is often the calendar year. Employees must be entitled to payment
of claims irrespective of how fully the account has been funded with their
contributions. 183 An employee could, for example, receive a distribution of five174

Id. § 125(f). Provisions under sections 106(b), 117, 127, or 132 are excluded,
however. Id. Life insurance is includable in gross income for the amount that the cost
exceeds the dollar limitation of section 79. Id.
175
Id.
176
Employee Benefits—Cafeteria Plans, 72 Fed. Reg. 43,938, 43,957 (proposed Aug.
6, 2007) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1).
177
Id.
178
Id.
179
EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., FLEXIBLE SPENDING ACCOUNTS, (2007), http://ww
w.ebri.org/pdf/publications/facts/0507fact-flexspend.pdf. “There are no legal limits on
contributions to a health-care FSA, but a plan sponsor may set a limit.” Id.; see also Ron
Lieber, The Fight over Flexible Spending Accounts, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2009), http://ww
w.nytimes.com/2009/09/26/your-money/health-insurance/26money.html?_r=1 (discussing
a congressional debate over whether a limit should be placed on how many pretax dollars
should be allowed to be set aside for health-care FSAs).
180
See Employee Benefits—Cafeteria Plans, 72 Fed. Reg. 43,938, 43,947–48
(proposed Aug. 6, 2007) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1).
181
See I.R.C. § 125(i) (2012); I.R.S. Notice 2012-40, IRS.GOV, http://www.irs.gov/pu
b/irs-drop/n-12-40.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2014) (providing guidance on the effective date
of the $2,500 limit under section 125(i) of the Code); I.R.S. Pub. 969 (2012), IRS.GOV,
http://www.irs.gov/publications/p969/ar02.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2014) (specifying a
$2,500 limit for FSA plans).
182
70 Fed. Reg. 43,938, 43,942–43.
183
Id. at 43,957.
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sixths of her account in January, even if she had only contributed one-twelfth of
her annual funding amount. 184 Expenses incurred outside of the plan period are not
reimbursable, even if a balance remains in the account. 185 Contributions to an
MFSA are, therefore, subject to a “[u]se-or-lose rule.” 186 This rule ensures that
benefits under a cafeteria plan will not be considered deferred compensation. 187
Reimbursement requests for expenses from an MFSA must be substantiated. 188
Like most benefits offered to employees through a cafeteria plan, funds
contributed to an MFSA are exempt from employer and employee payroll taxes,
including FICA and FUTA. 189 FICA—taxes collected from both employers and
employees under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act—funds benefits for
retirement, medical care, and disability. 190 FUTA—taxes collected from employers
under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act—funds unemployment benefits. 191
Exempting amounts contributed to MFSAs, therefore, results in lower government
revenues for these programs. Congress can, however, choose not to exempt certain
benefits offered under a cafeteria plan from these taxes, as is the case with
retirement plan benefits under a 401(k) plan. 192
Although medical flexible benefit plans were first introduced in 1974, they
garnered little interest for the first few years they were in existence, due to a
combination of employer and legal uncertainty as to how employees could use
such plans. 193 Those fears began to be alleviated with the introduction of section
125 of the Code and, during the 1980s, the use of flexible benefit plans began to
rise. 194 Allowing employees to select their own benefits has been identified as one
reason these plans garner support from both employers and employees. 195 Some
consultants tout the FSA as a recognized employee benefit that “is a key piece in a
comprehensive employee benefits offering” that can help to recruit and retain
employees. 196
184

Id. at 43,957–58.
Id. at 43,957.
186
Id.
187
Id.
188
Id. at 43,960–61.
189
See I.R.C. §§ 3121(a), (a)(2), (a)(5)(G) (2012).
190
Id. §§ 3101–3128. The tax encompasses both old-age, survivor, and disability
insurance and hospital insurance. For more information on payroll taxes generally, see
PETER J. ALLMAN, WITHHOLDING, SOCIAL SECURITY AND UNEMPLOYMENT TAXES ON
COMPENSATION (2012) (discussing the compensation subject to tax, employees and
employers subject to tax, the rate and computation of tax, and the reporting and deposit
requirements associated with employment taxes).
191
I.R.C. §§ 3301–3311 (2006).
192
I.R.C. §§ 3121 (v)(1)(A), 3306(r)(1)(A) (2012).
193
See Joseph R. Meisenheimer II & William J. Wiatrowski, Flexible Benefits Plans:
Employees Who Have a Choice, 112 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 17, 18 (1989).
194
Id.
195
Id. at 17.
196
See Porter-Rockwell, supra note 25.
185
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Although 40% of U.S. employees are eligible to participate in an MFSA, only
about a quarter of those eligible choose to do so. 197 A study conducted in 2005
revealed that 26% of employers who had at least ten employees offered MFSAs. 198
Of those employees who were eligible to enroll, 35% enrolled with an average
contribution of $1,235. 199 The net tax benefit for an average ($1,235) contribution
by an employee who earned less than $35,000 a year would be $282 under 2005
tax rates. 200 Employers also stand to gain tax benefits from participation; for an
employer with one hundred employees with a $30,000 average annual salary and
$1,237 contribution, 21% participation could trigger $1,987 in tax savings due to
decreased payroll taxes. 201
A separate study linked participation in FSAs to income and education levels,
with a higher income or educational level resulting in a higher participation rate.202
Participation at higher income levels stems in part from the increased tax break the
participant receives due to the marginal effective tax bracket; the higher the
bracket, the more incentive for the employee to participate in the FSA. 203 Tax
benefits of FSAs, however, are also valuable to lower-income nonitemizers,
because taxpayers electing the standard deduction can achieve them. 204
FSAs are not without their critics. The fact that FSAs offer a more valuable
benefit to taxpayers in higher income brackets has led to complaints from those
who would like to eliminate or limit the amount of tax reduction an employee
197

See Chodorow, supra note 168, at 1043 (citing U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF
LABOR STATISTICS, NATIONAL COMPENSATION SURVEY: EMPLOYEE BENEFITS IN THE
UNITED STATES, MARCH 2009, at tbl.36 (2009) (describing the percentage of U.S.
employees eligible to participate in health-care FSAs)).
198
EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., FACTS FROM EBRI: FLEXIBLE SPENDING
ACCOUNTS (2007), available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/publications/facts/0507fact-flexsp
end.pdf. The study was conducted by Mercer Human Resource Consulting. Id.
199
Id.
200
Id. The statistics assume a taxpayer under age sixty-five filing a single (not joint)
return. Id. Calculations are based on an employee in the 15% federal tax bracket plus FICA
tax contributions at a 7.65% rate. Id. Actual tax savings in other years would be based upon
the marginal rate in effect during the year the account was used.
201
Id. The $1,237 average contribution was based on employers with 10–499
employees; the $1,235 value applied to all employers with ten or more employees. Id.
202
See Hampton et al., supra note 167, at 102–08 (discussing factors behind
employee benefit choices). Hampton notes that the “mean and median family incomes for
participants [in the researcher’s study] were nearly $18,000 and $20,000 higher,
respectively, than that of nonparticipants.” Id. at 104.
203
Id. at 100.
204
Id. at 98. “[A] married taxpayer who [did] not have enough itemized deductions to
exceed the standard deduction ($6,200 in 1993 for a joint return) receive[d] no [additional]
tax reduction for medical expenses . . . .” Id.
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receives by electing to participate in an FSA. 205 Others argue that the structure of
FSAs promotes wasteful spending and that reimbursement procedures are vexing
and cumbersome. 206 The majority of complaints surrounding FSAs lie with the
provision that requires a participant to use it or lose it within the time frame
established under the Code. 207
The medical flexible spending arrangement is not the only flexible spending
arrangement authorized for cafeteria plans; employers may also offer dependentcare assistance or adoption assistance.208 Dependent-care assistance is authorized
under section 129 of the Code, which provides that “[g]ross income of an
employee does not include amounts paid or incurred by the employer for
dependent care assistance provided to such employee if the assistance is furnished
pursuant to a program . . . .” 209 While this could be implemented with a tax credit,
an employer has the ability to offer one such “program” through the use of an
FSA. 210 The employer simply includes the option as part of its overall cafeteria
plan, which is sanctioned under section 125. 211 In fact, FSAs are the most common
way an employer offers a dependent-care assistance program. 212 Dependent-care
benefits may extend to a variety of family members for whom the employee
provides care. 213 Employers benefit from offering these plans as well, because the
money an employee elects to use to fund the plan is not subject to payroll taxes to
which they otherwise would be if paid directly to the employee in a paycheck. 214
Like other plans offered under section 125, dependent-care programs have
205

Ron Lieber, The Fight Over Your Flex Account, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2009, at B1
(discussing a congressional debate over whether a limit should be placed on how many
pretax dollars should be allowed to be set aside for health-care FSAs).
206
See Uwe E. Reinhardt, The Trouble with (In)flexible Spending Accounts, N.Y.
TIMES ECONOMIX BLOG (May 29, 2009, 7:14 AM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/20
09/05/29/the-trouble-with-flexible-spending-accounts/?emc=eta1.
207
See id.
208
Employee Benefits—Cafeteria Plans, 72 Fed. Reg. 43,938, 43,958 (proposed Aug.
6, 2007) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1) (“Dependent care assistance (section 129),
adoption assistance (section 137) and a medical reimbursement arrangement (section
105(b)) are permitted to be offered through an FSA in a cafeteria plan.”).
209
I.R.C. § 129(a)(1) (2012).
210
Kathleen A. Murray, Child Care and the Law, 25 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 261, 293
(1985); see also Cheryl Geerhold, Establishing Dependent-Care Programs Through
Cafeteria Plans: Fulfilling the Need for a Well-Balanced Benefit Menu, 25 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 455, 464, 471 (1985).
211
I.R.C. § 125; Geerhold, supra note 210, at 464; Murray, supra note 210, at 293.
212
Giselle Sered, Day Care and Tax Policy, 12 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 159, 193 (1995).
213
Geerhold, supra note 210, at 470–71 (citing I.R.C. § 152(a) (1982)); see also
Lawrence A. Perlman, Use Spending Accounts to Save on Dependent Expenses, 73 TAXES
573, 573–74 (1995).
214
JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 70, at 54; Murray, supra note 210, at 294;
Sered, supra note 212, at 195.
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limitations on contribution limits.215 The policy behind offering dependent-care
assistance, including through a flexible spending account, is primarily to create
incentives for work. 216
Adoption assistance may also be offered by an employer as part of a flexible
spending account plan. 217 The Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996
authorized the creation and funding by employers of adoption assistance
programs. 218 The Act established the current section 137 of the Code, which
provides that “[g]ross income of an employee does not include amounts paid or
expenses incurred by the employer for qualified adoption expenses in connection
with the adoption of a child by an employee.” 219 These expenses must be offered
“pursuant to an adoption assistance program” 220 and may be expended directly by
the employee or paid for by the employer. 221
215

I.R.C. § 129(a)(2) (2012). The Code allows for a maximum contribution of $5,000,
however, this is further limited to an amount not to exceed the total income earned by the
lowest-income earning parent. Id. § 129(b)(1)(B). In the case of a married couple, should
one spouse not earn any income in the tax year, no money may be set aside pretax for
dependent care. See id.
216
Id. § 129(e)(1); JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 70, at 53. “The term
‘dependent care assistance’ means the payment of, or provision of, those services which if
paid for by the employee would be considered employment-related expenses under section
21(b)(2) (relating to expenses for household and dependent care services necessary for
gainful employment).” I.R.C. § 129(e)(1); see also Geerhold, supra note 210, at 471. The
Joint Committee on Taxation report stated that the provision was enacted because
“Congress believed that the child care credit provides a substantial work incentive for
families with children, [and] the Act increases the amount of expenses for which the credit
may be claimed,” and that “[t]he increases in the credit percentage are directed toward low
and middle-income taxpayers because the Congress believed that these taxpayers are in
greatest need of relief.” JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 70, at 53. Congress also
felt that employers should take a more active role in providing assistance to their
employees when it came to dependent-care costs. Id. at 54.
217
Employee Benefits—Cafeteria Plans, 72 Fed. Reg. 43,938, 43,958 (proposed Aug.
6, 2007) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1).
218
Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, 110 Stat. 1755,
1901 (1996). A somewhat less generous provision for adoption assistance, allowing
deduction for costs incurred in the adoption of a child with special needs, was established
under the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note
70, at 57. Congress passed this law based on the concern that the costs associated with
adoption were prohibitive in nature and felt that a small deduction should be allowed to
help ease this burden. Id.
219
I.R.C. § 137.
220
Id. The Code states that “[g]ross income of an employee does not include amounts
paid or expenses incurred by the employer for qualified adoption expenses in connection
with the adoption of a child by an employee.” Id.
221
Id. § 137.
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Types of flexible spending arrangements may not be combined. 222 For
example, one may not seek reimbursement for both dependent care and health care
from the same account.223 This separation of accounts affords employers additional
flexibility in determining the plan year for each account.224 Flexible spending
accounts remain popular elements of benefit plans offered to employees.225
Medical flexible spending accounts have accomplished a remarkable task:
extending the benefits of tax relief traditionally available only to itemizing
taxpayers to a wide variety of workers of varying income levels. The availability of
this tax benefit enhances the equity of the tax system, taking into account the
decreased ability to pay triggered by medical costs not reachable by the medical
expense deduction.
V. PROPOSING A CHARITABLE FLEXIBLE SPENDING ACCOUNT
Medical flexible spending accounts provide the model for a new tax incentive
for charitable giving. Just as medical flexible spending accounts have
supplemented the existing below-the-line deduction for medical expenses,
extending the benefits of tax-free medical costs to nonitemizers, charitable flexible
spending accounts can enhance the charitable deduction in a way that extends the
scope of the people benefitted by the tax subsidy and encourages increased overall
giving. The Treasury should recognize and employers should adopt a new
charitable flexible spending account regime.
A charitable flexible spending account, like the charitable deduction, can be
justified on the grounds of equity, efficiency, incentive for charitable giving,
monitoring, and pluralism. In each of these grounds, a charitable flexible spending
account achieves at least as much as the traditional charitable deduction. The
remainder of this Part discusses each advantage in turn.
A primary benefit of a charitable flexible spending account, when contrasted
with the traditional charitable deduction, is its superiority in terms of vertical
equity. Because the charitable income tax deduction is available only to the onethird of taxpayers who itemize, it produces an inverted tax result: it shifts tax
burden away from those most able to pay, and it provides no tax benefit for those
least able to pay. A charitable flexible spending account, by comparison, applies to
itemizing and nonitemizing workers alike, allowing nonitemizing individuals to
enjoy a tax benefit previously withheld from them. 226
222

72 Fed. Reg. 43,938, 43,942–43.
Id.
224
Id.
225
See Meisenheimer II & Wiatrowski, supra note 193, at 20.
226
Even a CFSA, however, is not perfect by vertical equity standards. Because it is
offered through employers, the unemployed could not participate. Furthermore, the nature
of the progressive rate system means higher-income taxpayers receive a higher subsidy of
their donations than lower-income taxpayers do. Despite its imperfections, a CFSA remains
a step in the right direction.
223
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A charitable flexible spending account also has advantages when it comes to
economic efficiency. The traditional argument for the economic efficiency of the
charitable deduction remains true: a charitable tax incentive results in the bulk of
the financial burden of a contribution resting with those who value it enough to
contribute, with a smaller fraction allocated to the general public. 227 This
leveraging of private dollars with federal funding is economically efficient. A
CFSA, however, is even more economically efficient because it leverages behavior
at a lower tax cost, as it reaches taxpayers in lower marginal rates. A contribution
incentivized by a CFSA can prompt a contribution with only a 15% “match” when
lower-income workers contribute; a charitable deduction fails to reach taxpayers in
lower brackets who do not itemize, and it is “buying” contributions largely from
taxpayers in higher brackets. 228
CFSAs also provide superior options when it comes to incentivizing
charitable giving. Like the charitable deduction, a CFSA prompts generosity by
providing a financial tax incentive, that in the reduction of income tax liability by
the value of the contribution multiplied by the marginal tax rate of the contributor.
This incentive, however, can potentially be offered to a broader range of
participants (all workers), as opposed to only those who itemize. Furthermore,
contributions to a CFSA may be further incentivized by a reduction in payroll
taxes. Whether the loss of revenue inherent to providing this reduction is justified
by the additional incentive is up to congressional judgment. Whereas most benefits
offered under a cafeteria plan are exempt from payroll taxes,229 not all are, 230 so
Congress would have the option of providing the additional incentive or not, as
deemed suitable.
A charitable flexible spending account provides similar incentives to donors
to monitor the behavior of recipient charities as a charitable deduction does. The
primary benefit of a CFSA over a deduction is the force of numbers. Greater
numbers of individuals with financial skin in the game means more pairs of eyes
on recipient charitable organizations.
Finally, a charitable flexible spending account also clearly bests a deduction
in terms of pluralism. A charitable tax subsidy, whether a deduction or flexible
spending account, allows a variety of taxpayers with a variety of views and
priorities to participate in funding decisions. Taxpayers who “vote” with their
dollars as to which projects merit funding, allowing the government to follow
those favored projects with a matching subsidy, 231 helps to ensure a variety of
priorities will be funded. 232 Expanding the pool of “voters” to include taxpayers
227

Gergen, supra note 89, at 1399–406.
For the sake of simplicity, these calculations exclude any impact of payroll taxes.
229
Most benefits under a qualified cafeteria plan, including MFSAs, are exempt from
payroll taxes. See I.R.C. §§ 3121 (a)(2), (a)(5)(G) (2012).
230
Congress can, and does, exclude certain cafeteria plan benefits from payroll tax
exemption, as it has with 401(k) plans. See id. §§ 3121 (v)(1)(A), 3306(r)(1)(A).
231
Levmore, supra note 120, at 405.
232
Polsky, supra note 122, at 648–49.
228
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who do not itemize will enhance diversity and offer a more representative view of
the priorities of our pluralistic society.
In addition to mapping nicely onto the justifications for the charitable
deduction, however, a CFSA offers additional benefits that the deduction does not.
First, it takes advantage of lessons from behavioral economics to increase saving
and budgeting for the purpose of making transfers to charities. Second, it provides
an opportunity for employers to enhance corporate culture through promoting the
value of philanthropy. Finally, it provides an oversight function, to ensure proper
reporting, superior to the system of taxpayer self-reporting and occasional IRS
auditing. Each of these issues will be addressed in turn.
Flexible spending accounts offer a substantial benefit that derives from the
lessons of behavioral economics to increase saving and budgeting for the purpose
of making transfers to charities. Studies suggest that people, when left to their own
devices, do not always make consistent consumer choices.233 Survey evidence
demonstrates that although people know they should save and why, many simply
don’t—particularly individuals and families with low incomes. 234 Scholars
studying this behavior have concluded that saving requires some level of effort and
self-control on the part of the individual. 235 As such, some level of incentive to
save, or some constraint against spending, helps individuals achieve their
respective spending goals. 236 A “precommitment constraint” is a mechanism that,
once adopted, allows a consumer to ensure future spending occurs at the level and
time that consumer originally hoped it would. 237 One such precommitment
constraint that can help a person achieve personal spending goals is an automatic
payroll deduction. 238 According to survey research, automatic payments or
withdrawals is a popular method by which a person can successfully achieve
financial goals. 239 Having amounts automatically deducted from an employee’s
paycheck “is beneficial in that it is viewed as going to the more untouchable
233

Deborah M. Weiss, Paternalistic Pension Policy: Psychological Evidence and
Economic Theory, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275, 1277 (1991) (citations omitted).
234
See THOMAS L. HUNGERFORD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., SAVING INCENTIVES:
WHAT MAY WORK, WHAT MAY NOT 7 (2006), available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.corne
ll.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1021&context=crs.
235
See, e.g., Sondra G. Beverly et al., A Framework of Asset-Accumulation Stages
and Strategies, 24 J. FAM. & ECON. ISSUES 143, 143–56 (2003) (discussing strategies to
resist spending temptations through an analysis of Hersh M. Shefrin & Richard H. Thaler,
The Behavioral Life-Cycle Hypothesis, 26 ECONOMIC INQUIRY 609, 609–43 (1988)).
236
Id. at 143–56.
237
Id.
238
Id.; see also Shlomo Maital & Sharone L. Maital, Is the Future What It Used to
Be? A Behavioral Theory of the Decline of Saving in the West, 23 J. SOCIO-ECONOMICS, 1–
32 (1994).
239
Automatic payments or withdrawals were the sixth-most-common response.
Barbara O’Neill et al., Successful Financial Goal Attainment: Perceived Resources and
Obstacles, 11 J. ASS’N FIN. COUNS. & PLAN. EDUC. 1, 3 (2000).
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future-income account, thus encouraging self-control.” 240 Enrolling in the
automatic funding of a charitable flexible spending account can leverage this
psychological boost to budget and result in greater contributions to charitable
organizations. 241
A charitable flexible spending account system would have positive
implications for employers as well. Charitable giving and philanthropic
involvement is a value of many corporations. 242 Some promote this value through
matching grants funded by a corporate private foundation. 243 Smaller businesses,
however, lack the funds necessary to fund and maintain a corporate foundation.
Allowing a charitable flexible spending account program would allow smaller
businesses to promote the value of philanthropy and charitable giving. 244
Employers are also likely to appreciate the payroll tax benefit that often
accompanies cafeteria plan benefits.245
An additional and critical benefit a charitable flexible spending account
offers, when compared to a self-reported charitable deduction, is the auditing
function of the plan administrator in ensuring accurate reporting of charitable
contributions. Individuals preparing their own returns may, deliberately or
inadvertently, report their contributions inaccurately. 246 Although taxpayers are
required to substantiate charitable deductions, 247 not all taxpayers maintain
240

Narat Charupat & Richard Deaves, How Behavioral Finance Can Assist Financial
Professionals, 3 J. PERS. FIN. 41, 44–45 (2004) (discussing strategies financial consultants
can use to help their clients achieve their goals).
241
It could be argued that lower-income individuals should not be provided
mechanisms to budget more for charity, to the extent they ought to be budgeting their
money for other purposes. To not offer a CFSA merely to discourage the proverbial widow
from donating her two coins, however, seems paternalistic and inappropriate. Cf. Luke
21:1–4.
242
See, e.g., Matching Gifts, GEN. ELEC. FOUND., http://www.gefoundation.com/empl
oyee-programs/matching-gifts/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2014).
243
For example, my former employer, Bank of America, matches charitable donations
made by employees by gifts from its corporate foundation. See Matching Gifts Program,
BANK OF AM., http://about.bankofamerica.com/en-us/global-impact/matching-gifts-features
-and-eligibility.html#fbid=e7m_1YvYxC5 (last visited Mar. 20, 2014). There is no need to
include a matching grant program in a cafeteria plan, because matching grants from
corporate private foundations are not considered taxable income to the employee. See Rev.
Rul. 67-137, 1967-1 C.B. 63, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/rr67_137.pdf.
244
When rating the “100 Best Companies To Work For,” Fortune considers “pride
[and] camaraderie, focusing on philanthropy and celebrations.” Marcia Heroux Pounds, JM
Family’s Family Auto Distributor Perennially Wins Recognition as a Great Place to Work,
SUN-SENTINEL OF FORT LAUDERDALE, Jan. 26, 2006, at 1D.
245
See §§ 3121 (a)(2), (a)(5)(G) (2012).
246
The IRS has identified “abuse of charitable organizations and deductions,”
including overvaluation of contributions, as common tax scams. See Beware of IRS’ 2010
“Dirty Dozen” Tax Scams, IRS.GOV (Mar. 16, 2010), http://www.irs.gov/uac/7.
247
See I.R.C. § 170 (f)(8)(a) (2012).
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evidence of the contributions they deduct. 248 Indeed, the IRS routinely inspects tax
returns and audits for overreporting where the charitable contributions seem
disproportionate to the taxpayers’ income. 249 The IRS, however, lacks the
resources to audit significant numbers of returns; only about 1% of income tax
returns are audited (and only a portion of these in connection with charitable
contributions). 250 Charitable flexible spending accounts would use private-sector
resources to monitor the substantiation of charitable gifts reimbursed through the
account.
Though largely analogous to the charitable deduction, and offering many
advantages to it, a charitable flexible spending account would have some
significant hurdles. One such hurdle is the task of arriving at a critical mass: the
CFSA program would not be effective if it were not adopted by a broad enough
group of employers and employees. Put differently, if itemizers were the only ones
that used CFSAs, the new program would serve no beneficial purpose. Higherearning itemizers would receive tax benefits; lower-earning nonitemizers would
not. CFSAs have potential to reach a broad base of donors, but whether they in fact
will is hard to predict. Not just the creation of CFSA programs, but also the use of
them, would change the face of philanthropy.
Another sticking point with offering a CFSA is concern over the extent to
which employers could control contributions or use CFSAs to gather information
on their employees. If employers could encourage or discourage donations to
certain organizations, or base employment decisions on charitable giving patterns,
freedom in selecting recipients would be curtailed. Having a CFSA overseen by a
third-party plan administrator might alleviate these privacy concerns. 251 If issues
arose, additional rules might be required to safeguard employee privacy and
security.
Another potential hurdle is the argument that CFSAs should not be open to
taxpayers who take the standard deduction, which theoretically includes a
charitable deduction component. 252 Taxpayers who take an itemized deduction
248

Maintaining good records is critical. See, e.g., Carole Feldman, In an IRS Audit,
the First Line of Defense is Having Complete, Accurate Records, BOS. GLOBE, Jan. 24,
2012, at B9.
249
See Karen Hube, Red Flags: IRS Taking a Closer Look at Tax Deductions, FISCAL
TIMES (July 22, 2011), http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2011/07/22/Red-Flags-IRSTaking-a-Tougher-Look-at-Tax-Deductions.aspx#page2.
250
Feldman, supra note 248, at B9 (“In 2011, the IRS audited nearly 1.6 million
individual returns, slightly more than 1 percent of the total. . . . Only 1 percent of people
with incomes under $200,000 had their returns audited; the audit rate for those with
incomes of $1 million and higher was about 12.5 percent.”).
251
Employees do, after all, disclose confidential health-care information in
connection with MFSAs.
252
There is often a tension between the simplicity established by the charitable
deduction and the equitable goals of the tax system. See John R. Brooks II, Doing Too
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would be required to forgo credit for charitable deductions made from their pretax
CFSAs, whereas taxpayers who do not itemize would not. 253
Despite the initial quandary raised by this potential duplication of reward for
charitable giving, the concern itself is easily discounted. It is unrealistic to believe
that the standard deduction presently includes a specific proportion to reflect
average charitable contributions, at least not with any semblance of accuracy.
Certainly there has been no attempt to adjust the standard deduction based on
recent empirical evidence of what would be qualifying charitable contribution
deductions of nonitemizing taxpayers. 254 Notably, from 1982 through 1986, when
taxpayers who took a standardized deduction were permitted to take a charitable
contribution deduction, the standard deduction was not decreased in 1982, yet it
was increased in 1985 to reflect this charitable giving component. 255 To the extent
the standard deduction no longer accurately reflects a substitute for the charitable
deduction (assuming it ever truly did), there should be no concern with
nonitemizing taxpayers receiving an income tax benefit for donations to charity. 256
Much: The Standard Deduction and the Conflict Between Progressivity and Simplification,
2 COLUM. J. TAX L. 203, 205 (2011).
253
Theoretically, this could also have been an issue for medical or adoption FSAs, but
it does not appear there was much conflict over this potential inequity.
254
It is also arguable that the purpose of the standard deduction has evolved such that
it no longer truly reflects a conglomeration of typical deductions. The standard deduction,
when coupled with personal exemptions, creates a class of individuals who pay no income
tax. The personal exemption alone used to accomplish this task, but it did not keep pace
with inflation. The standard deduction therefore evolved to fill this role. I must credit
Professor Bryan Camp with explaining this theory to me.
255
See H.R. REP. NO. 97-215, at 201−02 (1981) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1981
U.S.C.C.A.N. 285, 291−92.
256
Even if one assumes that the effect of combining a CFSA with the standard
deduction is to allow double credit for a charitable gift (to the extent the value of the gift is
included in the standard deduction itself), this “inequity” is milder than it may at first
appear. Remember that the charitable deduction is already an upside-down subsidy.
Imagine two taxpayers, one in the 15% bracket who does not itemize and one in the 35%
bracket who does itemize, each of whom gives $1,000 to the United Way. Under the
charitable deduction, the itemizer receives a $350 tax benefit. While the nonitemizer
receives no direct benefit, the value of the standard deduction takes into account a typical
level of charitable giving; assuming the $1,000 gift is the typical level of giving, it is as if
the nonitemizer received a $150 benefit. Under an FSA, if the itemizer funds his $1,000
gift with pretax dollars from his FSA, he forgoes the $350 itemized deduction (since it is
already effectively implemented by the pretax funding). On the other hand, if the
nonitemizer funds her $1,000 gift with pretax dollars from her FSA, she keeps the $150
benefit built into the standard deduction and receives an additional $150 benefit by virtue
of using an FSA. The nonitemizer has double-dipped. However, because the charitable
deduction initially provides a bigger benefit to those (itemizers) in higher marginal rate
brackets, the itemizer still enjoys a larger tax benefit ($350) than the nonitemizer ($300).
The structure therefore enhances the equity of the charitable tax subsidy rather than
threatens it.
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Although the idea of a fully charitable flexible spending account has not been
proposed in legal scholarship before now, a connection between the existing
medical flexible spending account and the charitable deduction has been made. In
Charitable FSAs: A Proposal to Combine Healthcare and Charitable Giving Tax
Provisions, Professor Adam Chodorow proposes amending the “use it or lose it”
provision of medical flexible spending accounts to allow a gift over of the balance
to a qualifying charitable organization of the taxpayer’s choosing. 257 The proposal
would allow an employee to designate a single qualifying nonprofit to receive the
balance, if any, remaining in an employee’s account at the end of a plan year. 258
Professor Chodorow argues convincingly that allowing a distribution of the funds
remaining in an MFSA to a charitable organization would be consistent with
existing tax law and policy with respect to both the charitable deduction and
MFSAs. 259 Allowing a gift of the balance would be a good start—but if we can get
our foot in that door, why not swing it all the way open?
Rather than allowing merely a distribution of the balance of an MFSA to a
charitable organization, taxpayers should have the alternative of a fully charitable
FSA. Having separate accounts for medical and charitable purposes would be more
consistent with the current structure of tax law, produce better incentives, and
create more flexibility. The current tax regulations require separate maintenance of
accounts for dependent care and for health care, so a separate account for
charitable contributions would be consistent with that regime. A primary purpose
of having an FSA is to encourage budgeting, and one is likely more able to
establish separate budgets for medical costs and charitable gifts than to make a
sensible estimate of the combination of the two. Having separate charitable and
medical FSAs also gives employers flexibility as to which to offer and employees
flexibility as to which to fund. The income tax incentives for charitable giving
could be significantly enhanced by the establishment of a flexible spending
account dedicated exclusively to reimbursement of qualifying charitable
contributions.
To implement a charitable flexible spending arrangement, the Treasury should
amend the proposed regulations governing cafeteria plans. It is possible to argue
that a CFSA is already authorized by the Internal Revenue Code and other tax
regulations. To the extent that section 125 permitted medical flexible spending
arrangements to flourish before the proposed regulations articulated them in detail,
charitable flexible spending arrangements may also be endorsed.260 To assure
257

See Chodorow, supra note 168, at 1041−42.
See id. at 1074 (explaining that “taxpayers would be allowed to select only one
charity as recipient”).
259
See id. at 1076 (citing I.R.C. § 125(d) (2012)).
260
MFSAs provide tax benefits that would otherwise be deductible under section 213,
subject to the limitations described in Part III of this Article, supra. However, MFSAs also
function somewhat like insurance, so perhaps their justification for tax-free treatment rests
upon sections 105 and 106 of the Internal Revenue Code, which exclude payments
employees receive from health insurance plans from gross income. It is unclear whether it
258
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employers, however, that these accounts are permissible, an express amendment to
the regulations would be helpful and may be necessary.
An amendment to the Code itself should not be necessary to authorize a
charitable flexible spending arrangement. Section 125 currently defines qualified
benefits under a cafeteria plan to include benefits that are “not includible in the
gross income of the employee by reason of an express provision of this chapter
(other than section 106(b), 117, 127, or 132),” as well as “any other benefit
permitted under regulations.” 261 Because of the integration of benefits permitted by
the regulations into the Code itself, an amendment to the Code should not be
required.
The proper place to include an amendment authorizing charitable flexible
spending accounts is the proposed Treasury Regulations to section 125 (“Proposed
Regulations”), which already authorize medical, adoption, and dependent-care
FSAs. The Treasury should amend a few provisions to include charitable FSAs in
this group 262 and add provisions detailing their administration. First, the Treasury
should add “Charitable Flexible Spending Accounts” as a new subsection,
(a)(3)(K), to section 1.125-1 of the Proposed Regulations, which lists benefits to be
offered under a cafeteria plan, and it should adjust the table of contents in section
1.125-0 to reflect this and any other changes to the regulation that affect the table
of contents. Second, the Treasury should amend section 1.125-5(h) to read,
“Dependent care assistance (section 129), adoption assistance (section 137), a
medical reimbursement arrangement (section 105(b)), and a charitable
reimbursement arrangement (for expenses otherwise deductible under section 170)
are permitted to be offered through an FSA in a cafeteria plan.”
The Treasury should also add provisions to the regulation that mirror those
used to explain and endorse the other types of FSAs. The following language is
based on the regulation used to permit a dependent-care assistance program and
could be adopted by the Treasury: 263

matters which Code section is relevant for purposes of whether MFSAs are analogous to
CFSAs. In any case, an express revision to the Proposed Regulations is likely necessary for
the assurance of employers.
261
I.R.C. § 125(f)(1). “[A]ny group term life insurance which is includible in gross
income only because it exceeds the dollar limitation of section 79” is also included. Id.
262
I have focused here on Proposed Treasury Regulations § 1.125-5, located at 72
Fed. Reg. 43938, 43942 (2007), but there are several other sections in the Proposed
Regulations that essentially just list the types of benefits that qualify under a cafeteria plan;
all of these references should be updated.
263
The language could either be adopted as a new proposed section 1.125-5(q), or in
place of proposed section 1.125-5(k) and relettering sections (k)–(p). For simplicity, I use
section (q) for the sample language.
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(q) Section 170 rules for charitable reimbursement arrangement
offered through a cafeteria plan—(1) General rule. In order for
charitable contribution reimbursement to be a qualified benefit that is
excludible from gross income if elected through a cafeteria plan, the
cafeteria plan must satisfy section 125 and the charitable contribution
must satisfy section 170.
(2) Charitable flexible spending accounts in general.
Section 170 provides an employee with a deduction from gross
income for qualifying donations to charitable organizations.
See paragraph (a)(5) in § 1.125-6 on when charitable donations
are completed.
(3) Reimbursement exclusively for charitable donations. A
charitable flexible spending accounts program may not provide
reimbursements other than for charitable donations; in
particular, if an employee makes charitable contributions less
than the amount specified by salary reduction, the plan may not
provide other taxable or nontaxable benefits for any portion of
the specified amount not used for the reimbursement of
charitable donations. Thus, if an employee has elected
coverage under the charitable flexible spending account
program and the period of coverage has commenced, the
employee must not have the right to receive amounts from the
program other than as reimbursements for charitable donations.
An employee may, however, designate one or more charitable
organizations that are to receive any funds remaining in the
account at the end of the plan year.
(4) Alternative to itemized deduction. An employee who
participates in a charitable flexible spending account shall not
take a deduction under section 170 for a contribution that is
reimbursed from the flexible spending account. A participating
employee may claim deductions under section 170 for
contributions that are not reimbursed, to the extent the
employee otherwise qualifies for a deduction under that
section.
Small adjustments should also be made to section 1.125-6 of the Proposed
Regulations, which relates to substantiation of expenses for cafeteria plans.
Paragraph (a)(4) of this regulation explains the details of reimbursements of
dependent-care expenses, and a new paragraph (a)(5) should be added to address
charitable flexible spending accounts. The following proposed language is based
upon section 1.125-6(a)(4) of the Proposed Regulations:
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(5) Reimbursements of charitable flexible spending account
expenses—(i) Charitable donations must be expended. In order to satisfy
section 170, charitable expenses may not be reimbursed before the
donations are expended. For purposes of this rule, charitable donations
are expended when the employee irrevocably transfers funds to a charity
and not when the employee pledges or otherwise agrees to make a
transfer in the future.
(ii) Charitable donations made during the period of
coverage. In order for charitable donations to be provided
through a charitable flexible spending account program eligible
for the section 170 deduction, the donations must be made on
behalf of the employee during the period for which the
employee is covered by the program. For example, if for a plan
year, an employee elects a charitable flexible spending account
program providing for reimbursement of charitable donations,
only reimbursements for charitable donations actually made
during that plan year are provided from a charitable flexible
spending account program within the scope of section 170.
Also, for purposes of this rule, expenses incurred before the
later of the program’s effective date and the date the employee
is enrolled in the program are not incurred during the period
when the employee is covered by the program. See also section
1.125-5 for FSA rules.
(iii) Example. The following example illustrates the rules
in paragraphs (a)(5)(i)–(ii) of this section: A is an employee of
Company X, which sponsors a charitable flexible spending
account. On April 1 of the plan year, A contributes $500 to U, a
university that is a qualifying charitable organization. On April
10, A pledges to contribute $1,000 to L, a library that is a
qualifying charitable organization, to be payable within five
years. The contribution to U is properly reimbursable from the
charitable flexible spending account. No amount of the pledge
to L is reimbursable unless and until the donation is paid to L
while A is participating in the program.
These modest additions to the existing Treasury regulations will provide
additional guidance for employers and employees who wish to participate in
charitable flexible spending accounts as part of a cafeteria plan. Employers who
already offer medical and dependent-care flexible spending accounts can enhance
their benefits offerings—and promote a corporate culture that values philanthropy
and community involvement—by sponsoring a charitable flexible spending
account.
The timing of the amendment to the Proposed Regulations is ideal. The
Treasury already must amend the Proposed Regulations to section 125 to reflect
the $2,500 cap on annual contributions to a medical flexible spending account
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required by the new health-care law. 264 The Treasury has, in fact, issued a notice of
proposed rulemaking; it did so in the summer of 2012. 265 The notice reflects a
willingness to amend the Proposed Regulations more broadly, specifically with
reference to the use-it-or-lose-it provision relating to the balance remaining in
FSAs at the end of the year, and it requests comments. 266 While the Treasury’s
attention is already directed to the regulations of section 125, it is a remarkable
opportunity to amend the regulations in a manner that would embrace CFSAs.
VI. CONCLUSION
The current federal system of tax law, in attempting to encourage the shift of
assets from private individuals to charitable organizations, fails to reach significant
portions of Americans. Not all donors are equal in the eyes of the law; donors with
particular demographic characteristics—ranging from income, to race, to state of
residence—are more likely to itemize than others. Despite its aim to reflect a
pluralistic society, the charitable deduction sanctions the privileging of one-third of
American voices over the rest. If taxes are ballots, the election is rigged. 267
Despite its shortcomings, the charitable deduction has many laudable goals
and accomplishments; it should be enhanced rather than abolished. What the
itemized deduction for charitable contributions needs is a supplement to extend its
benefit to taxpayers who do not itemize. This supplement is a charitable flexible
spending account offered to all workers. A charitable flexible spending account,
working alongside the charitable deduction, will complement the existing tax
structure to provide incentives to make charitable gifts in a way that achieves
vertical equity unattainable by a structure consigned to itemizing taxpayers.
Expanding the benefits of the deduction to lower-income taxpayers (and the many
others who do not itemize) enhances the pluralistic benefit of the nonprofit sector
and contributes to greater diversity and democracy in philanthropy.
A charitable flexible spending account, like the charitable deduction, can be
justified on the grounds of efficiency, incentive for charitable giving, pluralism,
equity, and monitoring. A charitable flexible spending account, however,
consistently outperforms the traditional charitable deduction on these grounds and
offers additional benefits. It leverages concepts from behavioral economics to
264

See I.R.C. § 125(i).
Section 125-Cafeteria Plans: Notice 2012-40, IRS.GOV, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs
-drop/n-12-40.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2014).
266
Id. The notice indicates that comments may be submitted by email to
Notice.comments@irscounsel.treas.gov or mailed to CC:PA:LPD:PR (Notice 2012-40),
Room 5203, Internal Revenue Service, P.O. Box 7604, Ben Franklin Station, Washington,
DC 20044. Id. The notice lists Elizabeth Purcell of the Office of Division
Counsel/Associate Chief Counsel (Tax Exempt and Government Entities), reachable at
(202) 622-6080, as the author of the notice. Id. This would seem to be the best way to make
the Treasury aware of this new proposal for a CFSA.
267
On “taxes as ballots,” see Levmore, supra note 120, at 405.
265
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increase saving and budgeting for the purpose of making transfers to charities. It
provides an opportunity for employers to enhance corporate culture through
promoting the value of philanthropy. Finally, it provides a superior oversight
function to ensure proper reporting and validity of charitable donations.
The creation of a charitable flexible spending account would be an
opportunity for symbiotic cooperation between government, the private sector, and
philanthropy. Working together, government tax support for private contributions
to charitable organizations can secure more robust funding of public goods and
services for the benefit of society. The current charitable income tax deduction
fails to leverage the substantial benefits the business sector has to offer in terms of
providing a platform for charitable giving and institutionalized oversight to
minimize abuse. In short, charitable giving tax incentives need work.

